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ABSTRACT 
 
“individual yet as one”: PERFORMING DEAFNESS AND PERFORMING 
COMMUNITY IN MARK MEDOFF‟S CHILDREN OF A LESSER GOD 
 
 
 
By 
Mariah Crilley 
May 2013 
 
Thesis supervised by Laura Engel, Ph.D. 
In this thesis, I examine the relationship between deafness, women, and 
performance in Mark Medoff‟s Children of a Lesser God. The play was a massive 
popular success, both in its run on Broadway and its movie adaptation. Deafness and deaf 
people had never been so visible in American hearing culture.  More importantly, the 
play coincided with civil rights movements by people with disabilities, which culminated 
in the passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act. Disabilities, including deafness, 
were called into being as part of a national identity. These movements posited self-
determination but ultimately relied and thrived on a communal and relational sense of 
identity. I argue that the play challenges individualistic modes of identification through 
its protagonist, Sarah, a deaf woman whose “voice” is always translated through the 
audience. The play overtly and politically calls for a reconceptualization of American 
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identity along the lines of deaf or disability and female identity theories, which typically 
value community and interdependence over individualism. Moreover, the genre amplifies 
this call for community. 
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Introduction 
In the spring of 1988, Gallaudet University, the world‟s only liberal arts 
institution for deaf students, hired a new president. Dr. Elisabeth Zinser, a Ph.D from the 
University of California at Berkeley (Green), spent years in “helping fields,” such as 
“nursing and educational psychology,” (Mask 187), was “an expert on language and 
communications” (Piccoli), and had previously held the prestigious position of vice-
chancellor at the University of North Carolina, Greensboro (“Elisabeth Zinser”). By all 
rights, Dr. Zinser was more than qualified for the position and should have been 
welcomed by students, faculty, and staff alike at Gallaudet. Within the day of her 
appointment, however, she was being burned in effigy.  
Unfortunately for Dr. Zinser, Deafness was not counted among her list of 
accomplishments. She was hearing. Unwittingly, but perhaps all the more dangerously, 
Dr. Zinser had accepted a position in an already volatile environment with little 
understanding of Deafness, its complex cultural aspirations, historical subjugation, 
resistance to a disabled identity, and, most importantly, its tongue, American Sign 
Language (ASL). Even before Dr. Zinser‟s official appointment, Gallaudet‟s campus was 
ripe with indignation. Despite going 124 years without a deaf president, the University‟s 
board seemed to be leaning towards the only hearing candidate of the remaining three 
potentials. Gallaudet‟s students, staff, and alumni were discouraged by the University‟s 
blatant paternalism—after all, these students were being taught to be self-sufficient and 
professional, “to excel in work and life” (Piccoli). The appointment of yet another 
hearing person to a position of power over some of the brightest Deaf people in the 
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world, to a position that should have always belonged to a Deaf person but never had, 
quite visibly demonstrated just how very little their higher education stood for when 
threatened by impenetrable misapprehensions and simple yet lethal stereotyping. Even in 
the 80s, the Hearing world still considered the Deaf unfit to manage their own affairs. In 
defense of the assignment, the chairman of the board said “„deaf people are incapable of 
functioning in a hearing world‟” (qtd. in Mask 188). While the “chairman later claimed 
that her interpreter had misconstrued her statement” (Mask 188), the fact remains that the 
chairman needed an interpreter. Despite being the head of the only liberal arts college for 
D/deaf people in the world, she did not know ASL, and therefore could not communicate 
with those who she represented.  In 1988, Deaf students at the premier—really the only—
higher education institute available to them, couldn‟t carry on a conversation with their 
chairman. 
So, they revolted. After the announcement, students poured into the streets of 
D.C., illegally marching to the hotel where the board was meeting. The police attempted 
to halt the deaf students‟ actions, but their dissent quite literally fell on deaf ears. The 
outraged students organized and effectively shut down the school‟s campus, barricading 
entrances with school buses on flattened tires (Mask 188). They boycotted classes, held 
rallies, burned imitations of Dr. Zinser and the chairman of the board, and rallied for a 
“Deaf President Now!”—the eponymous battle cry of the revolution, often shortened to 
DPN. Led by Greg Hlibok, student body president, the students drew up a list of 
demands, which included,  
1. Resignation of Dr. Zinser and selection of a deaf president.  
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2. Resignation of Mrs. Spilman [the chairman of the board, a hearing woman] and 
election of a deaf chairperson of the Board. 
3. Change of the composition of the Board to a majority of deaf and hard of 
hearing persons. 
4. Guarantee of no reprisals against the faculty, staff, administration, or students 
for their participation. (“DPN Fact Sheet”) 
The administration eventually implemented all of these reforms. Dr. Zinser stepped down 
after a massive media blitzkrieg, the chairman resigned, Dr. I King Jordan was appointed 
President, the board was reorganized, and students suffered no repercussions (Mask 191).  
In part, the success of the movement was directly contingent on media coverage 
and an overwhelming support from the public. The vast majority of America considered 
the Deaf students‟ revolt just and necessary and support surged in from all over the 
country. Students marched with a “We have a dream!” banner, uniting the DPN protests 
with the Civil Rights Movement (Mask 190). In fact, many of the protests directly 
borrowed rhetoric, strategies, and goals publicized by Black Americans in the 1960s. The 
protests were not a matter of childish rebellion intended to miss a few classes, but a 
cultural landmark in the Deaf rights movement, a symbol of successful self-
determination. 
Jesse Jackson said of the protests, “„The problem is not that the students do not 
hear; the problem is that the hearing world does not listen‟” (qtd. in Mask 190). Their 
passion, however, forced America to listen to their ardent signing and answer their 
demands. Deafness and Deaf people were perhaps never so visible in American history. 
The story was broadcast across the country through various outlets, including radio 
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programs, television specials, and newspapers. Americans became enamoured of the 
Deaf students, ushering in what Lane sardonically refers to as a “national lovefest with 
the deaf” (Mask 191). 
The protests, however, cannot have been the sole impetus for the nation-wide 
“lovefest.” While the demonstrations certainly heightened Deaf people‟s visibility and 
cited as “the high point of contemporary deaf history” by many deaf historians, including 
Harlan Lane (Mask 191), Gallaudet‟s Revolution followed in the wake of another pivotal 
cultural moment for deaf people: the play and movie Children of a Lesser God. Two 
years before the protests, Marlee Matlin, a deaf actress, won an Oscar for her portrayal of 
the deaf protagonist Sarah and became the first and only Deaf person to have ever won 
such an award. Even before the protests, therefore, Deaf people became visible as they 
had never been. I argue that this play represents a critical moment in Deaf American 
history in that it promulgated the variegated and complex nature of Deaf American 
experience not only to Deaf people starving for anything like an accurate representation 
of themselves but also to the unaware Hearing public. Spirko uses the protests to initiate 
his argument, but only hesitantly refers to their correlation as “perhaps not coincidental” 
(16).  While a direct, unified, and cohesive correlation between the play/movie and the 
protests cannot and could never be drawn, I would like to suggest that the play influenced 
both the Deaf students‟ heightened sense of self-determination and the public‟s 
overwhelming support.  
The DPN movement offered a clear sense of group identity and of Deaf pride, but, 
before the 1960s, deaf people had very few ways to articulate who they were. For the 
most part, they were forced to rely on medical or scientific discourses to define 
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themselves. As Tom Humphries explains, “[u]sually this included a reference to the 
degree of hearing loss…[and] the functional abilities of the deaf person: Could he/she 
hear and understand words without seeing the speaker‟s face and lips?” (3). According to 
Lane, “studies published in professional journals,” studies with purportedly “impartial 
scientific testing, ” categorized deaf people as “aggressive” and “submissive,” “isolated” 
and “clannish,” “egocentric” and “unconfident” (Mask 39). Despite being absurdly 
paradoxical, this list of characteristics suggests how intractable prejudices against the 
deaf were. These “studies” both reflected widespread cultural assumptions and cemented 
them through the guise of science. Lane and Humphries suggest, therefore, how 
pervasive and naturalized the negative connotations of deafness were in the United 
States. Perhaps more importantly, these works reveal how little say deaf people had in 
how they were perceived and defined. 
In 1965, however, the “narrative” framing of deafness began to evolve 
(Humphries 6). While ASL was considered useful by most deaf people, if not damnable 
by the majority of hearing educators, it was not until the publication of William Stokoe‟s 
Dictionary of American Sign Language that ASL was defined as an authentic language. 
Humphries asserts,  
This was shocking to both Deaf and hearing people not because signs were 
catalogued, but because Stokoe employed linguistic analysis and terminology to 
explain a finding—that sign language is indeed a language—which seemed to 
contradict all earlier scientific explanations. (6) 
The validation of ASL not only overturned all previous conclusions, but also began to 
counteract those negative attributes ascribed to the Deaf. With their language no longer 
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denigrated as abstract or hieroglyphic, deaf people began to break free of oppressive 
stereotypes. 
 Linguistic validation proved critical, but this validation would have been 
inconsequential without the performances that transformed Deaf history and definitively 
created Deaf culture. With Stokoe‟s analysis, deaf people began to talk about themselves 
and their language. Humphries explains, “Deaf people began to perform the language in 
public” (7). Moreover, they took to performances as a way to articulate the growing sense 
of their identity, their language, and their differences from the hearing mainstream. They 
performed ASL to demonstrate its complex linguistic and signifying systems, and 
“ritualized explanations” became the means by which average deaf people performed and 
defined Deaf identities in everyday conversations (13). By this time, as Humphries 
argues, “Deaf had value” (16). In 1977 at the National Symposium on Sign Language 
Research and Teaching, Carlene Canady Pedersen and Carol Padden performed ASL for 
a diverse audience. First, the pair signed how to change a car‟s oil. The beauty of the 
visual imagery impressed people, but this demonstration seemed to support reinforce the 
belief that ASL could only articulate concrete concepts. Then, however, the two moved 
onto signing something more abstract than the physical act of changing oil. They 
“gave…a detailed and visually striking depiction of Crick and Watson‟s double helix and 
how cells reproduce, down to the smallest detail of the matching strands of matter” (11). 
This performance was so remarkable that “many confessed afterwards that they had not 
understood the concept of DNA before Padden‟s explanation” (Humphries 11). 
Manifesting the scientific validation of ASL through performance, this display 
counteracted the widespread notion that ASL was simple or abstract. These performances 
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ranged from theatrical endeavors and scholarly presentations to everyday, mundane 
conversations.  
In the same year that Pedersen and Padden visualized DNA, astounding their 
audience, Mark Medoff met a deaf actress. He learned a few signs and attempted to write 
a leading role for the deaf woman. Over the course of three years, Medoff‟s well-
intentioned but misguided seed of an idea germinated into the complex and award-
winning play Children of a Lesser God. While the play went through many drafts, the 
final product chronicles a love story between a deaf woman and a hearing man, set 
against the backdrop of a school for the deaf and a movement for deaf civil rights, deftly 
considering gendered, disabled, and performed identities.  
While Medoff claims that he “set out to write a love story” and that the play‟s 
implications for deaf pride and hearing people alike were “accidental, though very 
pleasing” (“Introduction”), the play itself calls for a reconceptualization of American 
identity along the lines of deaf or disability and female identity theory which typically 
value community and interdependence over self-determination. The model of 
individualism, independence, binaries, and dichotomies that has long governed American 
ideals and dreams quickly falls apart in the complicated landscape of Sarah and James‟ 
love and the political backdrop of the play. Most importantly, over the course of the play, 
Sarah undermines American individualism in what I dub her “individual yet as one” 
model. Towards the end of the play, in her most self-aware and unmediated speech, Sarah 
signs “the sign „to connect,‟ a simple sign—but it means so much more when it is moved 
between us like this. Now it means to be joined in a shared relationship, to be individual 
yet as one. A whole concept just like that” (89). Articulated through a reference to an 
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ASL sign, Sarah expresses that she wants “to be individual yet as one,” to be 
acknowledged as a full person, an identity stripped from her as a disabled woman, and to 
connect meaningfully to other people. Aligning more closely with Deaf culture and 
practices of the theater, Sarah‟s model is not only important for those disabled people 
who daily live dependence and interdependence but for every person living in a hyper 
individualized world. While people with disabilities are most overtly written out of the 
national narrative because of their practical and theoretical dependencies, all people and 
especially all bodies are alienated in a system that privileges independence and 
individualism at the expense of interdependency and community. Sarah‟s model, 
therefore, a model explicitly enacted by Medoff in the space of the theater, works to 
revise the national narrative on disability for the benefit of all people.  
What I see at work in the play, and what I argue over the course of this thesis, is a 
trilateral articulation of “individual yet as one.” First, the play‟s emphasis on Deaf 
culture, which normally prizes community over independence, introduces the theoretical 
foundation for “individual yet as one”—a translation of a sign itself. Through Deaf 
culture, Medoff and Sarah offer an alternative to traditional, American identity. Second, 
the complicated relationship between disability and gender, particularly the immense 
subjugation that Sarah faces as a Deaf woman, refines this model to include reciprocity, 
that is, the respectful articulation, acknowledgement, and acceptance of personal needs 
and desires. Sarah‟s dual alienation from American modes of identification highlight how 
truly untenable conventional, American identification is not only for the disabled but for 
everyone. Third, this model is visibly enacted through the “performance community,” 
activated through the generic conventions of the theater (Barr 16).  When James fails to 
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become “individual yet as one” with Sarah, the audience forms this union with her, 
participating in both Sarah‟s fruition as a character and the experience of the theater 
itself. In this way, Medoff both calls for and elicits the “individual yet as one” model, 
moving beyond a theoretical fantasy by offering the living experience.  
While I have separated the model‟s components, I would like to stress that this 
triad is not tiered but a pastiche, interlocking, jumbled, confused, and only extricated for 
the purposes of my own clarity and sanity. Over the course of this thesis, therefore, I 
attempt to untangle the web of identities, interactions, and articulations that inform and 
illuminate this model. Like any critical undertaking, however, I inevitably favor one 
identity at the expense of others, misplace, forget, or overlook important evidence, and 
commit those very same mistakes I warn against. 
 In the first chapter, I delve into the play‟s representations of D/deaf identities, 
using Deaf history and contemporary Deaf and disability studies frameworks to 
understand characters and their motivations, focusing closely on the protagonist Sarah 
and her understandings of Deafness and identity. While a large portion of this chapter 
works to define Deafness, its relationship to disability, and its connection to mainstream, 
hearing America, a vexed agenda of its own, the majority of the chapter is spent on 
examining Sarah‟s association with independence as it relates to Deaf and national 
identities. Here, I argue that Sarah champions a Deaf mode of identification—
interdependence—particularly, through the “individual yet as one” speech. Her insistence 
on community is not only a central tenet of cultural Deafness but a direct challenge to 
notions of independence and individualism that are paramount to American identity. 
People with disabilities are not seen as “independent” and are therefore written out of the 
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national narrative. Part of my purpose in writing this chapter, then, is to closely examine 
the elevation of independence and denigration of dependence. Dependence and 
interdependence need not be negative but can be productive models of human interaction. 
If these definitions are expanded, then what it means to be American can also be refined 
as well and those with disabilities can become a part of the national identity and legacy. 
 From this emphasis on Deafness, I shift in the second chapter to closely examine 
the interaction between Sarah‟s disabled and female identities. While disabled men 
certainly encounter oppression and prejudice, disabled women are doubly persecuted. In 
this chapter, therefore, I focus on the intersecting systems of oppression, patriarchy, 
ableism/audism, and nationalism that actively work to suppress Sarah‟s revolutionary 
potential and her radical model of identification. While Sarah encounters trouble in 
defining and asserting her identity after she marries James, this psychologically 
harrowing embattlement with her female identity allows her to refine her exemplum. 
Here, she learns that it is not enough to merely be interdependent, but that this network of 
interactions must resist hierarchy and domination.  While James wants to make Sarah 
over in his own, hearing image, Sarah discovers that no one has the right to define 
another person‟s identity, needs, or abilities. Instead, the “individual yet as one” model 
works through an interdependent network that acknowledges and respects how each of its 
members names and defines herself. 
 In particular, the form, a play, exemplifies Sarah‟s message. Throughout the third 
chapter, therefore, I argue that the genre illuminates and amplifies Sarah‟s model of non-
dominating interdependence. The theater is not only a revolutionary space for 
demonstrating the performative nature of all identities, but also a living, breathing, and 
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working model of collaboration. The communal process inherent to creating live theater 
makes Children‟s argument all the more potent. In particular, this chapter focuses on the 
staging of Sarah‟s ASL and its translation. While James typically translates for Sarah into 
the third person, Sarah‟s “individual yet as one” monologue is actually more of what I 
will call a “dualogue” as Sarah and James “speak” in tandem, Sarah signing and James 
translating in first person. Moreover, here I will focus on those moments that Sarah isn‟t 
translated for the audience. Incapable of understanding Sarah, the audience becomes the 
community Sarah yearns for not through simplistic audience-protagonist identification 
but through uniting through difference. Unable to understand, the audience briefly 
apprehends Sarah‟s position, but, more importantly, learns that pure accessibility is 
neither possible nor preferable. Just as Sarah‟s “individual yet as one” model expands to 
include reciprocity, here, the audience further refines the exemplum, showing that 
accessibility need not be a prerequisite for acceptance. While James fails Sarah, the 
theatrical experience and audience interaction fully realizes the play‟s model for 
identification and cooperation.  
 The “individual yet as one” model may seem a lofty ideal, a noble if impractical 
articulation of the possibilities of Deaf culture and the theater to transform injustices 
within contemporary American society—itself a fashionable flourish in academia. While 
I certainly argue that this model is enacted in the space of the theater, Gallaudet‟s 
Revolution also represents the fruition of the model. For one, the DPN protests were, like 
other Civil Rights movements, a means of testifying to a history of degradation and 
oppression. The protests witnessed, as a communal event, individualized experiences 
with stereotyping, mistreatment, and prejudice. Protests that explicitly sought the 
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resignation of the hearing president also actively fought for deaf ancestors who couldn‟t 
and so that later deaf generations wouldn‟t have to. The DPN movement condensed an 
historical, worldwide struggle for recognition into a single event. It was, in many ways, 
“individual yet as one,” attesting to the experiences of the deaf across time and nations. 
 Moreover, the protests suggest exactly what‟s at stake when one fails to become 
“individual yet as one.” Separated by age, experience, audiology, and, most importantly, 
culture, the Board that elected Dr. Zinser certainly excelled at being “individual” but 
utterly failed at becoming “as one.” Incapable of understanding their deaf student body, 
or, at the very least, unable or unwilling to accept that this student body understood itself, 
the Board never become one with them. Thus, the protestors, capable of joining together 
to articulate their desires, succeed. The DPN movement, therefore, visibly enacts that 
model Children of a Lesser God forwards—its practical implementation and its 
irrepressible power to change history and to transform lives. 
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“As if there were no I”: Deafness, Ind/Interdependence, and National Identity 
 
In the most important monologue of Children of a Lesser God, Sarah pointedly 
defends her deafness, saying “my ability to communicate is as great as yours. Greater, 
maybe because I can communicate to you in one image an idea more complex than you 
can speak to each other in fifty words” (89). Her speech, of course, is signed and James, 
her hearing husband, translates. She continues, “For example, the sign „to connect,‟ a 
simple sign—but it means so much more when it is moved between us like this. Now it 
means to be joined in a shared relationship, to be individual yet as one” (89). Here, Sarah 
proudly asserts both the efficiency and eloquence of ASL and the play‟s refrain: “to be 
individual yet as one” (89). This theme resonates and proliferates throughout the play, 
from what Sarah says, to how she says it, through James, to the dramatic genre itself. 
Sarah insists that ASL and deafness, and by extension herself, are not only worthwhile 
but perhaps better than verbal language and hearing because of how community is 
evinced in the language. Sarah‟s sign condenses much of what Deaf culture stands for: 
personal identity against conformity, pride against degradation, and community against 
individualism. 
 In this chapter, I will examine the ways in which the play explores deaf and 
disabled identities in relation to community. First, I plan to delve into the sometimes 
strained relationship between deafness and disability, including deaf culture‟s tendency to 
disavow a disabled identity in favor of a cultural one. Here, I will explore modes of deaf 
identification and guidelines for membership in deaf communities, significantly how the 
play destabilizes a homogenized deaf identity. The larger portion of this chapter, 
however, will be devoted to exploring the sometimes antithetical relationship between 
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Deaf and American identities, particularly through their differing attitudes towards 
independence and community. Various forms of deaf and disabled communities are 
practically and theoretically embedded in networks of dependence and interdependence, 
each of which threatens that persistent and distinctly American ideal of independence. I 
will conclude the chapter by examining the same scene I began with, exploring Sarah‟s 
yearning for an independent identity, an “I” that has been systematically kept from her 
and other people with disabilities, and her call for community and interdependence. Deaf 
identity, specifically Sarah‟s Deaf identity, threatens American notions of individualism. 
Rather than polarizing independence and community, however, the play argues for an 
alternative, reciprocal framework for conceiving individual identity. Sarah‟s call to be 
“individual yet as one” suggests a different mode to define oneself, one that recognizes 
individuality but also posits a network of relations as critical to identity formation.
1
 The 
play resists the seeming dichotomy of Deaf and American cultures, therefore, and offers a 
new paradigm for what it means to be Deaf and American. 
 
Disabling Deafness: Defining D/deafness and Disability 
 
Disability itself is a complicated term, with a vexed relationship to deafness. In 
his book Signifying Bodies, G. Thomas Couser considers a disability any “irregularity, 
defect, dysfunction, or anomaly in the body,” an elastic definition that can encompass any 
kind of mental or physical condition (21). In many ways this coincides with the current 
legal definition: “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more 
major life activities of such individual (“Americans”). Some of these disabilities might 
include,  
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paraplegia, quadriplegia, AIDS, multiple sclerosis, cerebral palsy, stroke, 
blindness, bipolar disorder, cancer, spina bifida, muscular dystrophy, spinal cord 
injury, asthma, polio, epilepsy, amputation, depression, cognitive disability, and 
alcoholism. (Fox & Lipkin 82)   
This extensive catalog includes physical disabilities, mental disorders, illnesses, diseases, 
and deformities. Many businesses even categorize maternity leave as disability. The term 
disabled, therefore, is an expansive and fluid term, embracing a veritable taxonomy of 
impairments.  It includes minor disabilities, such as asthma, transitory ones such as 
cancer, and poster ones like paraplegia and quadriplegia. Even those  “regarded as having 
such an impairment” are protected by the ADA (“Americans”). Disabilities can be visible 
and invisible, finite and infinite, overwhelming or relatively insignificant. The word 
“disabled” defies strict categorization and resists concrete definition, lending the term a 
pliable fluidity that often goes unrecognized. 
At some point in his or her life, therefore, everyone will be considered disabled, if 
even only through aging. In fact, people with disabilities represent the largest minority 
population in the United States (“Facts”). Despite the sheer numbers of those with 
disabilities, the able-bodied population and even those who fall under the category of 
disabled fail to acknowledge the term‟s comprehensiveness. In part, this aversion derives 
from the colossal stigmatization of the label itself.  As Adrienne Asch and Michelle Fine 
suggest, “[d]isabled persons…often elicit in non-disabled others powerful existential 
anxieties about their own helplessness, needs, and dependencies” (245). The disabled 
represent all that we fear and augur our own inevitable futures—entropy, lack of control, 
and death. People are not only terrified of becoming disabled but also of being considered 
 16 
 
disabled by others. Disability is “not simply a physical affair,” but an “ontology, a 
condition of…being in the world” (Murphy 90), abruptly disrupting how the individual 
understands herself and the world around her and how that world perceives her.  
One aim of the disability rights movement, therefore, has been to universalize and 
expand the term in order to destigmatize disability. In revealing the social construction of 
disability, that is the role that society plays in defining “ability” and “disability,” the 
disability rights movement has attempted to expunge blame and cultural prejudices that 
insidiously prey upon both the disabled and the able-bodied. Their purposes have been to 
show how all bodies and lives are damaged in a society that consider illnesses, diseases, 
and disabilities products of personal blame or only of consequence to the bearer. 
Expanding the denotation of the word is therefore extremely helpful and critical to 
engendering social and legislative change. It may, however, create further factions within 
an already immensely diverse group. While the field “disability studies” is discussed, the 
term belies a group identity where no clear, easily accessible, and cohesive definition 
exists.  
 Where Deaf Americans differ, however, is in their distinct and clearly articulated 
group identity. As Harlan Lane writes, the “universalizing view” that is the mainstay of 
disability studies “is strikingly at odds with the DEAF-WORLD, small, tightly knit, with 
its own language and culture, sharply demarcated from the rest of society” (“Construction 
of Deafness”162).2 Herein, lies one of the most important issues facing disability and 
                                               
2
 Lane‟s phrase “DEAF-WORLD,” is a transliteration or written version of an ASL sign. While 
there is no agreed upon method of translating ASL to the written word, I have maintained the 
integrity of Lane‟s article and kept his original transcription. With other sources, therefore, I have 
opted to maintain the author‟s original transcription. See “Signs of Their Times: Deaf 
Communities and the Culture of Language” (86-89) by Richard J. Senghas and Leila Monaghan 
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deaf studies: whether to identify as Deaf, and as a culture and linguistic minority, or as 
disabled. While the two terms are not mutually exclusive, they are frequently considered 
such, especially by culturally Deaf people. The situation is complicated, however, for to 
identify as disabled is practical, especially in terms of governmental benefits, but it may 
also elide the lived experiences of D/deaf individuals and minimize their claims to a 
cultural identity. If they allow themselves to be subsumed by the category disabled, the 
uniqueness of their language and identities may be reduced to a physical or biological 
impairment.  
 The threat that the identifier “disabled” poses to their culture is one of many 
reasons deaf individuals do not consider themselves disabled. In part, this resistance also 
derives from a history of misdiagnosis and misunderstanding. Throughout much of 
history, deafness was considered a cognitive disorder and people with varying degrees of 
hearing loss were lumped into other categories of disability. Because they were thought 
to be unable to speak, the deaf were also thought incapable of reasoning (Garnett 24, 
footnote 8).
3
 Even into the twentieth century, deaf people were misdiagnosed, routinely 
shuffled into mental institutions, and degraded as simpleminded. Sarah herself was 
misdiagnosed and considered “retarded” until she was twelve-years-old (28). While 
Sarah may not have been “retarded” in the sense that she was mentally handicapped, she 
is subject to the prejudices and cultural biases that conflate deafness with cognitive 
disorders. In the cultural psyche, deafness still correlates with stupidity. In this sense, the 
                                                                                                                                            
for an extensive overview of the types, benefits, and drawbacks of various transcription services 
used in translating ASL to the written word. 
3 For many eighteenth-century theorists, including John Locke and Samuel Heinicke, “[a]rticulate 
language” was considered the “one springboard for the mind to use in developing abstract 
thinking” (Garnett 24, footnote 8). Spoken language, unlike signs, was considered the only means 
to complex cognition. Heinicke, an early educator of the deaf, taught through what was known as 
the German method, or spoken language rather than a codified signed language. 
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Deaf‟s resistance to the category of disabled is a disavowal of many misconceptions of 
deafness.
4
  To continue to call the Deaf “disabled” may only reinforce those 
presumptuous yet trenchant misunderstandings of d/Deafness.  
 The underlying issue is that deafness has been pathologized or reduced to a 
biological issue waiting to be “fixed.” In “Constructions of Deafness,” Lane takes on 
what he labels the “Disability vs. Linguistic Minority” debate (154). While he recognizes 
the various factors that propel both movements, he definitively champions the cultural 
model of deafness. Lane suggests that the disability construction of deafness, as a 
problem awaiting amelioration, only serves to aggrandize the health industry and 
misrepresents central tenets of Deaf culture (155-59). He argues that disability advocates 
and the disability construction of deafness, though well-intentioned, only further obscure 
the cultural aspects of Deafness. For example, the desegregation movement so crit ical to 
the disability rights movement does not consider the exiguous role that schools for the 
deaf play in forming and promulgating Deaf culture and community (161-62).  While 
Lane perhaps too easily denigrates the relative benefits of assuming a disabled identity, 
he reveals the true crux of the disabled-cultural debate: choice. Many culturally Deaf 
people resist the label of disabled exactly because it has been affixed to them without 
their consent. 
                                               
4
 Moreover, if deaf children were not diagnosed, they would frequently develop the cognitive 
disorders they were otherwise stigmatized with. While the modern medical establishment gauges 
an infant‟s range of hearing quite early, these kinds of tests did not exist throughout much of 
history. Busy, working-class and impoverished parents simply may not have realized their 
children were deaf. Because infant language acquisition is critical to higher cognition, forming 
important neurological links and bonds, deaf children necessitate more careful instruction than 
their hearing counterparts (Christiansen & Leigh 364-68). Without this knowledge, these children 
may have developed the cognitive disorders that were already ascribed to them, further blurring 
the line between deaf and disabled to the consternation of culturally Deaf people. 
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Most important, then, is how deaf individuals define themselves. Deafness, while 
officially listed a disability, is rarely conceived as such by members of the group. In Deaf 
culture, deafness is normal (Grushkin 118). Conversely, being hearing or speaking is 
considered “the marked condition” or abnormality (Grushkin 118).  Paddy Ladd, a British 
Deaf rights activist, claims “Labeling us as disabled demonstrates a failure to understand 
that we are not disabled in any way within our own community” (qtd. in “Constructions 
of Deafness” 159). Frequently, this is the hardest tenet of Deafness for hearing people to 
understand. As Lane explains, “hearing people led to reflect on deafness generally begin 
by imagining themselves without hearing—which is, of course, to have a disability but 
not to be Deaf” (166). To even begin to understand Deafness as a culture, therefore, the 
biological state of deafness must be accepted as is rather than as lack, dearth, or tragedy. 
Instead, Deaf people are a linguistic and cultural minority, as Sarah and Orin, a deaf 
student and apprentice teacher, repeatedly assert throughout the play. Despite being 
constructed through a biological reality, Deafness is contingent on various cultural 
factors, as I will discuss below. The term disability, however, elides these cultural aspects 
of Deafness, such as language and education that will be discussed more concretely 
below, and stigmatizes a physical trait with no stigma within their own culture. 
While numerous historical and critical reasons divide the D/deaf from the 
disabled, I argue that many more are shared. Given a history of misdiagnosis and total 
misunderstanding, the Deaf‟s resistance to the term is understandable. I certainly favor 
the cultural model of Deafness that celebrates ASL and Deaf culture. I take issue, 
however, with what appears to be a limited and misinformed definition of disabled. In 
disavowing the term “disabled,” many Deaf individuals merely reiterate mainstream, 
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able-bodied society‟s prejudices against disabilities and those with them. Deaf culture‟s 
push for cultural validation is important but their polarization of such terms as “disabled” 
and “cultural” further elides the function of the social realm in the construction of 
disability, the role that society plays in defining normalcy and average bodies. Claiming 
the title of disability for deafness would not only connect Deaf people to a larger minority 
group, engendering greater political representation, but would also undermine the exalted 
position of the able-body. Both deafness and disability critique the normal or average 
body, revealing the socially constructed nature of every body. Despite the fraught history 
between deafness and disability, I maintain that the two categories inform and illuminate 
each other. Throughout this thesis, therefore, I use disability theory to discuss aspects of 
Deaf culture, particularly in respect to community in this chapter and gender in the next.   
 
Deaf Variation, Identity, and Culture in Children of a Lesser God 
 
Rosemarie Garland Thomson asserts that “In interpreting the material world, 
literature tends to imbue any visual differences with significance that obscures the 
complexity of their bearers” (Extraordinary 11). While many disabilities are visible, 
although certainly not all, deafness frequently “obscures” itself, an invisible, untagged 
state of being. Its presence is only discerned through a glimpse of a hearing aid or 
cochlear implant, tucked behind hair, through proud and emphatic signing, or through 
abnormal speech patterns. Deafness may be able to hide more effectively than paraplegia, 
but its cultural resonance similarly “obscures the complexity of [its] bearers” 
(Extraordinary 11). Just as other disabilities face their own specialized stigma, D/deaf 
people have been oppressed, repressed, and homogenized in lived experiences and in the 
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cultural psyche. While literary representations may create and compound negative 
correlations, these spaces can also be the arena for contesting and reclaiming disabled 
identities. In fact, rehabilitation must take place through representation. Part of Medoff‟s 
strategy in Children of a Lesser God, then, is to represent the richness and variegated 
nature of Deaf culture. Medoff resists the historical homogenization of a culturally, 
linguistically, and personally diverse group of people. Almost every character, whether 
she is hearing or deaf, understands deafness in different ways as can only be true in lived 
Deaf experiences. While the bulk of my analysis focuses on Sarah, and will occur below, 
here, I would like to examine the other two deaf characters, Lydia and Orin. Sarah and 
James are, undeniably, the primary emphasis of play, but Medoff‟s inclusion of Lydia 
and Orin begins to populate this “Deaf world.” Although Medoff never explicitly 
interrogates Deaf culture or Deaf history, Lydia and Orin represent different points on the 
culturally Deaf spectrum. They vary in their actions, their goals, and in how they identify. 
Their presence in the play, therefore, suggests the variation within Deaf culture and 
attests to the visceral history and existence of that culture. 
 The first character, Lydia, appears on stage the least. Lydia is James‟ speech 
student and a peer of Orin and Sarah‟s. She wears hearing aids, abettors that are only 
useful if the user has residual hearing, and is learning to speak effectively over the course 
of the play. She watches television and has a crush on James, annoying Sarah (59). In 
other words, Lydia appears to be an average teenager.  Moreover, the play seems to cast 
her as an average deaf person, somewhere between Orin and Sarah‟s polarities. Lydia is 
not an active protestor against the Hearing mainstream or belligerently independent and 
anti-speech, but a young woman trying to discover who she is and how to identify.    
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For deaf individuals, then, identity runs along a continuum.  The “d”eaf 
community can be used to encompass all deaf individuals, but the “D”eaf community 
primarily indicates people who were either born deaf or who have lived most of their 
lives deaf, use manual communication, specifically ASL, went to a school for the deaf, 
and were born to or raised by Deaf parents (Grushkin 122). A person could be 
biologically profoundly deaf, or only able to hear over 95 decibels, as Sarah appears to be 
(49), but this does not mean that he or she is Deaf (Grushkin 116). Being biologically 
deaf does not automatically entail inclusion in culturally Deaf communities therefore. 
Rather, various factors including education, heritage, and language form Deaf identity 
along a spectrum. This does not mean, however, that those who do not fulfill each of 
these requirements are immediately disqualified from membership (Recovering 223). For 
example, a biologically deaf person who is taught orally may not have access to ASL and 
therefore the Deaf community.  Conversely, a child of deaf parents or adults (CODA) 
who is not deaf can, in fact, be Deaf, if he primarily socializes with other deaf people 
through ASL. Donald A. Grushkin writes that audiological definitions, how much or how 
little hearing a person possesses, the impairment, “may serve well for bureaucratic 
purposes, but within the interpersonal realm…frequently possess little meaning” (116-
17).  In other words, deafness is relatively unimportant to Deafness. 
While “Deaf” is a fluid term, a spectrum rather than an exact classification, there 
are authorized ways of performing Deafness.
5
 Despite being cast as average, Lydia 
embodies a potentially liminal position in terms of strict Deaf culture: Her hearing aids 
and capacity for speech make her nearly “oral.” An oral deaf person, who uses lip 
                                               
5
 In other words, Deafness is primarily a matter of choice, or performance, a line of inquiry I will 
pursue in the third chapter along with a close analysis of the genre.  
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reading, hearing aids and speech for communication and does not rely on any form of 
manual communication, is considered “think-hearing,” a deaf person who “„thinks like a 
Hearing person‟” (qtd. in Grushkin 123). An oral person, therefore, approximates hearing 
and does not ascribe to Deaf notions of identity (Grushkin 123).  Rather, those who are 
“think-hearing” may consider deafness, the biological condition, a plight rather than a 
way of life. Similarly, the ASL sign for “hearing” and “oral” are the same (Recovering 
224). The language conflates speaking with hearing. As Lane concludes, “Deaf people 
call an acquaintance „ORAL‟ who will not acknowledge his deafness. They say 
disparagingly that that person „ALWAYS-PLANS‟ actions for every situation, in order to 
pass acceptably in a hearing world” (“Constructions of Deafness” 6). In strict Deaf 
culture, therefore, speaking and lipreading are congruent without selling out or 
attempting to pass as hearing.
6
 Sarah, therefore, fiercely resists speaking as a militant 
gesture of her Deafness, belittling both Lydia and Orin for their speaking. Lydia does not 
appear to be ostracized for speaking and wearing hearing aids and she certainly signs, but 
her presence in the play suggests that despite both the hearing and Deaf world‟s attempts 
to quantify and categorize D/deafness, many d/Deaf individuals do not fall neatly into 
any category.  
Like Lydia, Orin is learning to speak. Orin, however, is also a leader of deaf 
rights.  In a scene between James, the hearing speech instructor, and Orin, his deaf pupil, 
Orin dutifully repeats James‟ words. When he successfully pronounces “Sanction,” James 
congratulates him saying “Yes! Good for you. How did that feel?” (2).  Orin, however, 
                                               
6
 While I do not have the time here, I find striking correlations between the term “pass” in both 
Deaf and African American cultures. Some disability theorists, including Couser, have likened 
disability memoirs to slave narratives (Signifying 44), however, none has offered a full analysis of 
the connections. Tying D/deaf and disability narratives into a minority cultural tradition may 
authorize their claims to culture. 
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counters with “How did it sound?” (2). Orin‟s determination to learn how to speak does 
not derive from any kind of emotional need to connect with hearing humans or from a 
sense of inadequacy, but from a desire to “change [the] system” (22). His purposes in 
learning English are purely practical. In order to combat the hearing mainstream, he must 
know their language. Orin declares, “One of these days, Mr. Leeds, I‟m going to change 
this system” (22). Orin‟s driving impulse is to overturn the audist establishment, a system 
that denigrates deafness and attempts to instill hearing tenets and practices into each of its 
students. 
While the play‟s school for the deaf seems to allow ASL, Orin‟s statement belies 
a history of oppression and degradation. Because deafness was considered a pathological 
condition, one to be assuaged through any means necessary, whether through ear 
trumpets or hearing aids, many important people and groups throughout history have 
actively worked to extirpate the “blight.” Men like Alexander Graham Bell overtly 
supported a eugenics movement against the deaf, which included “isolating the deaf 
through intermarriage, culture, and residential schools” in order to root out the disease 
(Lou 83). Similarly, the Nazi regime forcefully sterilized 15,000 people with hereditary 
deafness, while an even greater, unknown portion was euthanized (Monaghan 11). 
Pathologized deafness posits that the inability to hear begets a low quality of life, and, in 
this framework, needs to be cured. Perhaps more insidiously, this pathology suggests that 
it would be better to be unborn than to be born deaf. 
Overt eugenicist movements against the deaf are certainly not a part of 
contemporary American life, but less subtle methods of denigrating Deafness still 
proliferate. For one, ASL has been routinely devalued by hearing educators and the larger 
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public. For many years, ASL was widely considered a hieroglyphic language that did not 
and could not encompass abstract or metaphysical ideas, a mindset that numerous 
institutions and people in positions of authority validated. Bell vehemently opposed 
signed language because he believed “it would hamper, if not prevent, the development 
of oral skills, as well as limit intellectual development” because signed language was 
“less abstract than spoken language” (Lou 83). If deaf people wanted to live in the world, 
marry, have children, work, and generally lead a beneficial and wholesome life, they 
needed to learn how to speak. Oral-only pedagogy, or the instruction of the deaf through 
completely oral/aural means, therefore, dominated until the mid-twentieth century. 
Students at oral-only schools were forbidden from using sign language and forced to 
communicate expressly through speaking and lip-reading (Baynton 137). Oral-only‟s 
implicit assumption is, of course, that the d/Deaf want to live in the hearing world. While 
this methodology no longer prevails, many schools for the deaf still operate under the 
presumption that English is more grammatically complex and abstract than ASL, and 
many more average Americans consider ASL a simple visualization of English (Newman 
89-90).
7
  
                                               
7
 Many other contemporary policies and technologies work to colonize deaf individuals and strip 
them of Deaf identities in much the same fashion oral-only pedagogy did. Mainstreaming, or 
sending deaf children to hearing schools, hearing aids, and cochlear implants have all been 
considered insidious tools meant to extirpate D/deafness. In each of these examples, deaf people 
are removed from any sense of Deaf community. Currently, however, the cochlear implant (CI), 
and, in particular the pediatric cochlear implant, is considered the most dangerous technology to 
Deaf culture. For those with sensorineural hearing loss, CIs replicate hairs that stimulate the 
auditory nerve, which in turn conveys sound to the brain (Christiansen & Leigh 363). While CIs 
replicate the actions of the hairs in functional hearing, stimulating the auditory nerve, they cannot 
fully reproduce hearing. Because language acquisition occurs during infancy, the optimal time for 
implantation and for the technology‟s success is between twelve and eighteen months. Still, 
cochlear implants do not “„cure‟” deafness (Monaghan 19).  CIs can improve hearing, although 
children often still need additional aid, including sign language translators or captioning, 
especially in the classroom (Christiansen & Leigh 366). If the CI is not completely effective and 
the parent chooses to forgo alternative methods of language instruction, such as sign language, 
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When Orin claims he wants to revolutionize the system, then, he wants to 
overthrow “the „audist establishment‟” that has stripped deaf people of their Deafness 
(“Constructions” 166). Audism, a term popularized by Lane but coined by Tom 
Humphries, encompasses all the ways in which the hearing mainstream, especially those 
in power, maintain the supremacy of spoken language and devalue Deafness, both as a 
biological state and a cultural category. Audism “is the corporate institution for dealing 
with deaf people, dealing with them by making statements about them, authorizing views 
of them, describing them, teaching about theme, [and] governing where they go to 
school” (Mask 43). Oral-only education and burgeoning technology, such as the cochlear 
implant, are merely tools of a system that has long denigrated d/Deafness and d/Deaf 
people. Audism, therefore, denies deaf individuals their right to a culturally Deaf 
community, to a world in which their biological condition is not tragic but celebratory 
and their language and culture not inferior but legitimate and vital. 
One of the ways audism maintains its power is through the manipulation of the 
educational system. Orin, for example, is banned from his goal of being a teacher because 
of audism. His deafness purportedly keeps him from being an effective instructor to the 
deaf. Lane writes,  
In many communities it just happens that to be a teacher of deaf children you 
must first qualify as a teacher of hearing children, and deaf people are excluded as 
                                                                                                                                            
the “delay…can retard the whole process of language acquisition and mental development” 
(Monaghan 19).  Complete and unchecked reliance on oral-only education can stunt implanted 
children.  Often CIs are viewed as the final cure, when in reality careful language development 
and close examination are still necessary. Implanted children do not become hearing and still 
require immense speech training (Christiansen & Leigh 367). Hearing parents who only wish a 
happy and successful life for the deaf child may inadvertently rely on a piece of technology that 
awkwardly positions deaf children somewhere between the Deaf and hearing worlds yet fully in 
neither. 
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teachers of hearing children. In other communities, it just happens that to become 
a teacher of deaf children the candidate who is most capable of communicating 
with them is disbarred because he or she must pass an examination couched in 
high register English without an interpreter. (“Constructions” 158) 
As Lane indicates, the pedagogical system in place for educating the deaf nearly 
definitively forbids deaf instructors from teaching deaf students. In a system that 
considers spoken language the best language, deaf instructors are set up to fail. Audism 
mandates that the deaf be educated, but only to the extent that they fall in line with the 
hearing world‟s ideologies and assume the mantle of wrong, deviant, and disabled. 
Paternalism, however, is both a descendant and co-conspirator of audism. During 
the nineteenth century, many literary representations figured the deaf as saintly others. 
Because they could not hear, they need not fall victim to the evils of society. They were, 
in a sense, swaddled in protective silence. Of course, this silence could also construe the 
deaf as naïve and innocent—victims.  At the very least, they necessitated the protection 
of the mature, if not evil themselves, hearing world (Batson & Bergman 3-4). As Douglas 
Baynton succinctly concludes, “Deafness, then, confers both the benefit of innocence and 
the burden of ignorance: two sides of the same coin” (134). In an address to students at 
Gallaudet, Harlan Lane insists that “when the powerful set out to assist the powerless, 
when benefactors create institutions to aid beneficiaries, a disease sets in so no good can 
come of it; the name of that disease in human relationships is paternalism” 
(“Paternalism” 4).  He continues, arguing that “Hearing paternalism…sees its task as 
civilizing its charges, restoring the deaf to society,” a world which, for the most part, they 
have no interest in (“Paternalism” 5). Paternalism, like audism, posits that the deaf need 
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to be saved, to be taught English in order to function in the hearing world, and that the 
hearing world and its contingent officers, hearing educators and the medical 
establishment, must do the saving. While Lane characterizes audism as a ruthless 
ideology, hearing paternalism is cloaked in kindness but perhaps more poisonous for its 
facade. As in colonial contexts, hearing paternalists assume the charge of their deaf 
children as a kind of privileged burden that must be borne for the progress of all society. 
Orin, while certainly a victim of audism, is also exploited by a paternalist system that 
educates and trains him to be a fully-functional member of society so long as he 
continues to defer to audism, to those mandates that determine that he is unfit to teach.  
In many ways, James, the hearing speech instructor and Sarah‟s love interest, 
represents both the hearing world and this legacy of paternalism. Most of Orin‟s 
indignation, therefore, is directed at James. Orin rails at him, saying “You think learning 
to sign means you can communicate with us, that because you want to change us we want 
to be changed,” indicting the educational system “that sticks us with teachers who 
pretend to help but really want to glorify themselves!” (22). Orin‟s renunciation of James 
seems accurate. When Sarah asks James why he became a speech instructor, he replies 
saying “In the sixties it seemed important to do things that weren‟t simply self-serving” 
(20). Sarah poignantly counters, “Isn‟t this self-serving?” (20). James is undoubtedly 
well-intentioned, but his repeated attempts to make Sarah speak and his insistence that 
ASL “is just as good as” English “among the deaf” reveals his own latent paternalism 
(16). Towards the end of the play, James laments the fact that Sarah cannot hear and 
enjoy the music that is so vital to him (64-65). When Sarah tells him not to be sad and 
that she “could never know what music sounds like,” he responds, crying “But it makes 
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me sad for you, damn it!” (65). As Lane suggests, James, as a hearing man, can only 
understand deafness “by imagining [himself] without hearing” (166). For James to be 
without hearing would be a disability, to miss the things he loves, like music. He may 
understand Sarah‟s deafness but he utterly fails knowing her Deafness. Despite teaching 
deaf students and marrying a Deaf woman, James still fails to move beyond paternalism. 
His sadness indicates pity rather than understanding and punctuates their marriage and 
interactions like the refrain he wishes Sarah could hear. 
Not only the hearing are paternalistic. Even though he is Deaf, Orin also 
reinforces the paternalism and stereotypes that have beleaguered the deaf for centuries. 
Early in the play, Sarah slyly mentions that Orin “thinks he‟s the guardian of all us deaf 
children because he‟s an apprentice teacher and speaks” (25). His mission is to overthrow 
the audist system, but he also engages in the paternalism it perpetuates by positioning 
Sarah as the archetypal “Pure Deaf” person (75). In his meeting with Klein, the lawyer, 
he attempts to use Sarah as an authentic manifestation of Deafness, a person who neither 
speaks nor lip reads, to promulgate the Deaf cause to the world. Klein, in her legal 
efficiency, decides that Sarah‟s plight, while it may have made her “unhappy…all [her] 
life” will be “very useful” in the forthcoming civil rights trial (74). When Sarah decries 
Klein‟s portrait of her, Orin rushes to explain what Sarah means. Orin refuses to let Sarah 
speak and instead speaks for her. He needs Sarah to silently stand in for Deafness, to 
embody the spirit of his campaign, but her marriage to James and her entrance into the 
hearing world soils the purity of her Deafness. While the hearing world may homogenize 
D/deaf people and culture, Orin reduces Deafness to a single and frankly untenable 
definition—complete isolation from the hearing world. His crusade against the audist 
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regime, while well intentioned, and his manipulation of Sarah perpetuate the myth that 
the deaf need to be safeguarded or protected by those more capable. Orin‟s goals for his 
culture are critical, but his methods are far too reminiscent of the legacy of paternalism 
that seems a redundant theme of Deaf history.
8
 
 While Orin strives for greater representation and rights for d/Deaf people, recently 
academia, and, in particular, linguists and ethnographers have welcomed Deaf people and 
their culture into the fold. Numerous studies have analyzed families with deaf children or 
parents, deaf people in various nations and subcultures, and the ways in which language 
is used amongst deaf people. These prescriptive authorities have validated Deafness as a 
way of life rather than a simple, pathological aberrance (Senghas & Monaghan). 
Moreover, despite a history of audism and antagonism, many contemporary schools for 
the deaf embrace ASL, Deaf culture, and Deaf history. While the wider public may still 
consider ASL a visible manifestation of English and deafness a pathological anomaly, 
linguists and anthropologists have made immense strides in the fields, studying different 
aspects of D/deaf life, including signed languages, technologies, and transcription 
services (Senghas & Monaghan). To the trained professional, if not to every average 
citizen, Deafness has largely been welcomed and validated as a culture. This culture, of 
course, is where Orin and Lydia reside, if somewhat uncomfortably. Through these 
characters, their averageness, their paternalism, their speaking/signing, and hearing aids, 
Medoff demonstrates the immense variation in Deaf culture that has not only fascinated 
researchers but evidently audiences as well. He resists a homogenized, simplistic 
                                               
8
 Orin‟s control of Sarah is not merely paternalist but also sexist.  As a Deaf man, he still lives 
through a more privileged position than Sarah as a Deaf woman, a point I will discuss at length in 
the second chapter. 
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rendering of Deaf people, instead offering a glimpse into the tragic history and optimistic 
future of Deaf culture. 
 
Sarah, Deaf Leader 
 
From the beginning of the play and presumably even before, Sarah stands as a 
fiercely independent Deaf woman. When she meets James, the hearing speech instructor, 
however, she is forced to reevaluate herself, her identity and her beliefs. Throughout the 
play, Sarah is buffeted between the hearing and deaf worlds as represented by James and 
Orin. James persistently tries to make her speak, from the beginning of their relationship 
through their marriage.  Orin, however, wants to use her as the poster child for his 
burgeoning deaf rights movement. After a particularly gruesome meeting between Sarah, 
James, Orin, and Edna Klein, the lawyer, James says to Sarah, “I don‟t know which role 
you‟re playing here. Is this Sarah the Pure Deaf Person, or Sarah Norman, the old 
isolationist maid, or is this Sarah Leeds, teammate of James?” (75).  Sarah later responds, 
“I don‟t know which role I‟m supposed to play. Orin treats me like an idiot. You treat me 
like an idiot. Now the lady lawyer treats me like an idiot” (76). Each character attempts to 
use her for different reasons, to reduce her identity to one uncomplicated definition as 
James suggests. They refuse to understand the performance innate to Deaf identity, to any 
identity really, as I will explore in both the second and third chapters. Regardless of their 
reasoning, they hope to use Sarah as a pawn. Sarah, torn between all, is left unable to 
ground herself or her identity. 
While Orin and Lydia exemplify potentially liminal positions in terms of strict 
Deaf cultures, Sarah appears to embody cultural Deafness. Unlike Lydia or Orin, Sarah 
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was born deaf (28). She does not wear hearing aids, read lips, or speak. She only signs. 
Because language is the primary method of inclusion and exclusion for the Deaf 
community (Recovering 223), ASL serves as a pivotal aspect of Sarah‟s identity. 
Moreover, it serves as the bedrock of Deaf culture‟s claim to a cultural identity. ASL is 
not a visual, bastardized version of English, but a language with its own vocabulary and 
grammatical structure (Newman 89-90).
9
 To the majority of the hearing mainstream, 
however, ASL is visualized English. As Sarah asserts in defense of herself and ASL, “I 
have more than enough communication skills” (30) and proudly proclaims “I have a 
language that‟s just as good as yours!” (16).  
Sarah, therefore, is further from that derogatory term “think-hearing” than any 
other character in the play. She is resolutely Deaf, hence Orin‟s desire to use her as a 
“Pure Deaf” symbol for his movement (75). When Orin decides to “file a complaint” 
about unfair “hiring practices,” he tells Sarah “I want you with me…Because you‟re deaf. 
And pure deaf” (68). Sarah quickly perceives his true intentions, signing “With you? Or 
to follow you?”  (68). As I have suggested, Orin wishes to use Sarah as an example of 
Deafness, but his paternalism prevents him from perceiving Sarah as a partner rather than 
an icon. Sarah‟s Deafness, however, is tainted by her relationship with James. Because 
affiliations and interactions are pivotal to a Deaf identity, dating and marrying a hearing 
man sullies her status as “Pure Deaf.” In fact, when Sarah marries James, Orin calls her 
“a phony hearing person” for marrying outside of d/Deafness (71). The marriage 
viscerally disrupts her self-perception, as I will discuss in the second chapter, forcing her 
                                               
9
 Many people still believe that American Sign Language (ASL) is a broken form of English, 
despite numerous linguistic studies (Newman 89-90). This belief might contribute to the 
complicated relationship between deafness and disability. If the language is considered broken or 
incomplete, then D/deaf culture‟s claim to a minority status rather than a disabled one is 
undermined. 
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to reconsider her Deaf identity. In many ways, signing may be her only connection to the 
Deaf world, her identity, and her heritage. 
Despite or perhaps because of Sarah‟s passionate relationship with signing, James 
desperately wants to change this aspect of her person. One of the primary impetuses of 
the play and even of their romance is James‟ desire to have Sarah speak. When Sarah and 
James first meet, Franklin, the principal, introduces the pair, claiming that “Sarah has a 
certain aversion to learning speech” (4). Sarah and James‟ first interaction, therefore, is 
an overblown attempt to force Sarah to speak. When James inevitably fails, he takes her 
out on a date. At an Italian restaurant, James orders for her and asks “Wouldn‟t you like 
to be able to function in the hearing world?” (17). Sarah simply answers “No.” Despite 
her trenchant refusal to speak or lip read, James continues to push her, throughout their 
courtship and into their doomed marriage. James‟ repeated attempts to coerce Sarah‟s 
voice threaten the very core of her identity as a deaf woman and ultimately ruin their 
relationship.
10
  Tentatively positioned on the fringes of Deaf culture because of her 
marriage, speaking might completely obliterate any sense of Deafness she maintains. 
Moreover, these attempts suggest James‟ own privileging of the spoken word as a more 
authentic expression of the self.
11
. Despite being an educator of the deaf and marrying a 
                                               
10
 In the second chapter, I will closely examine how gender affects Sarah‟s Deaf identity. In 
particular, I argue that James‟ coercions represent a bodily violation akin to rape. 
11
 In Course in General Linguistics Ferdinand de Saussure divides written language and speech, 
privileging the spoken word over the written one. While Jacques Derrida through the term 
“différance,” notably departs from his predecessor, the implicit dialogue between the two opens 
up intriguing ideas in terms of deafness. By privileging speech as the complete fruition of a 
subject, Saussure simultaneously denigrates all forms of communication beyond the spoken.  
Does speech also mean manual communication, American Sign Language, for example? If deaf 
people do not “speak,” are they not subjects?  Conversely, is ASL a form of writing, per Derrida? 
While Derrida does not explicitly examine silence or manual communication, différance posits 
understanding beyond speech or in conjunction with other modes of communication.  It insists 
upon multiple means of understanding, congruent with theoretical frameworks such as post-
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Deaf woman, he still privileges English and denigrates ASL. Sarah‟s stance, however, 
illuminates the importance of ASL to Deaf identity.
12
 Her repeated insistence on using 
ASL, then, is an assertion of her normalcy in Deaf culture and a resistance to that 
derogatory term “think-hearing.” James‟ coercions are not merely annoying or 
pretentious, but a direct assault on her identity. As one Deaf person claims, “If you want 
to change ASL or take ASL away from the person, you are trying to take his or her 
identity away” (qtd. in Humphries 14). 
While others attempt to use her, to manipulate her deafness to construe her as 
pure or tragic, Sarah knows how to define herself and her particular brand of deafness. 
When talking with James, Sarah signs “I live in a place you can‟t enter. It‟s out of 
reach…Deafness isn‟t the opposite of hearing, as you think. It‟s a silence full of sound” 
(32). Sarah‟s characterization of deafness is both poetic, or “romantic” as James describes 
it, and antagonistic (32).  When Sarah claims that James cannot enter into her “place,” her 
space, she means that James as the archetypal audist figure holds no power over her mind 
or body.  Furthermore, she rejects the negative connotation of deafness as lacking or 
missing rather than simply different.  When she attempts to explain what she means by “a 
silence full of sound,” James cannot understand her complicated ASL. And, if he cannot 
understand, neither can the audience. Without his translation, Sarah‟s understanding of 
deafness becomes as inaccessible to us as hearing is to her. Instead, the audience is left 
with the ephemeral beauty of her signs and the wisdom that comes from recognizing our 
                                                                                                                                            
colonial and feminist studies.  Derrida perhaps critiques the authoritative speaking subject to 
make room for those voices or signs that have not been “heard.” 
12
 Language serves as the basis of the cultural identity; however, many different kinds of 
languages proliferate within the Deaf community. Among American deaf people, a variety of 
languages exist, including ASL, Pidgin ASL, and Signed English (Newman 116).  Each of these 
languages represents a different position within the Deaf community.   
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inability to understand. We are, quite literally, left in “a silence full of sound” (32). 
Sarah‟s Deafness is, like Orin and Lydia‟s, merely one, ephemeral point on that spectrum 
of Deaf identity, equally as viable and beneficially unique. While Lydia and Orin suggest 
the variation within Deaf culture, Sarah stresses the inestimable importance of ASL to 
Deafness. Like any other language, ASL informs, crafts, and evolves Deaf culture and 
Deaf identity. Without it, undoubtedly, Deafness would not exist. 
 
Independence, Dependence, or Something in Between: Reinscribing American Values 
through Disability 
 
Part of Sarah‟s Deaf identity then is her fierce resistance to the hearing world, her 
independence from it and rejection of speaking and lip-reading. Sarah‟s most important 
speech in the play, therefore, is an assertion of self-worth and self-ownership. She begins 
by saying, “For all my life I have been the creation of other people,” who told her that she 
was deaf and therefore wrong, that she was “dumb” and therefore wrong, and then 
decided that she was not actually dumb “but to be smart [she] had to become an 
imitation” of the hearing world (89). In other words, Sarah matured in an audist system 
that explicitly labeled her deviant and wrong. Her defiant rejection of English, then, is a 
complete disavowal of this reading. She explains,  
for all my life people have spoken for me: She says; she means; she wants. As if 
there were no I. As if there were no one in here who could understand. Until you 
let me be an individual, an I, just as you are, you will never truly be able to come 
inside my silence and know me. (90)  
In this speech, Sarah asserts her own self-worth and identity. She clearly explains that she 
has tried to be what others wanted, tried to approximate hearing, but it is impossible and 
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insulting to her.  Because she is Deaf, a product of audism and paternalism, people have 
always “spoken for” her, whether it be James, the hearing man, or Orin, the Deaf man 
(90). In this system, her inability to speak somehow warrants and allows others to speak 
for her. What she wants, therefore, and what she pleas for is that “I,” that independent 
voice and identity that has long been kept from her as both a deaf person and a woman by 
a history of audism, paternalism, and ableism. 
Sarah‟s desire for independence is indicative of a wider call for self-determination 
by people with disabilities. As Susan Wendell outlines in “Towards a Feminist Theory of 
Disability,” “Many disabled people who can see the possibility of living as independently 
as any able-bodied person, or who have achieved this goal after long struggle, value their 
independence above everything” (273).  While Sarah is not physically dependent and 
thereby able to achieve many cultural notions of independence, her assertion of 
personhood and identity is important given the historical and cultural correlation between 
disability and non-identity.  Frequently, disabled people occur as stereotypes rather than 
fully fleshed characters in the media and in literature. As Garland Thomson asserts, 
Disabled literary character usually remain on the margins of fiction as 
uncomplicated figures or exotic aliens whose bodily configurations operate as 
spectacles, eliciting responses from other characters or producing rhetorical effect 
that depend on disability‟s cultural resonance. (Extraordinary 9) 
Moreover, characters with disabilities are rarely written or criticized through the lens of 
disability studies, but “often interpret[ed]…metaphorically or aesthetically…without 
political awareness as conventional elements of the sentimental, romantic, Gothic, or 
grotesque traditions” (Garland Thomson 9-10). Because literature and media almost 
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always assign meaning rather than humanity to disabled characters, lived interactions 
between disabled and non-disabled people are always fraught with awkwardness, shame, 
and averted glances. Robert K. Murphy asserts that disability “robs the encounter of firm 
cultural guidelines, traumatizing it and leaving the people involved wholly uncertain 
about what to expect from each other” (87). Moreover, “[e]ven the best-intentioned able-
bodied people have difficulty anticipating the reactions of the disabled, for interpretations 
are warped by the impairment” (Murphy 87). In a culture that simply does not know what 
do with disabled people, Sarah‟s assertion of an “I” is particularly exiguous.13 
Independence, however, especially for those with disabilities, is always 
complicated. The word independence can be defined in innumerable ways, from self 
government, to financial means, to taking care of one‟s person without intervention by 
others (“Independence”). In the American political arena and in many other political 
definitions, independence and its contingent meanings derive from John Locke. In her 
discussion of the relationship between disability and American identity, Emily Russell 
traces the history of individualism (30). As Russell argues,  “enduring models of liberal 
citizenship,” those tenets that govern American ideals “imagine political independence 
through John Locke‟s concept of an inalienable „property in one‟s person‟” (2), “one‟s 
                                               
13
 In a discussion of people with disabilities and lesbians and the concept of passing, Barbara 
Hillyer writes that “women who dress and behave in heterosexually approved ways can be heard 
with less automatic resistance when they criticize American standards of beauty or heterosexism 
in general. The political stance, here, is that one can undermine the patriarchy from within only if 
one can pass” (145). Sarah‟s critique of American culture is, therefore, problematic. Often 
portrayed by a beautiful actress, such as Marlee Matlin, the play seems to support Hillyer‟s 
assertion that only the beautiful can critique dominant culture. While this problem necessitates a 
more thorough discussion, I think Sarah‟s attractiveness, evidenced by the actress portraying her, 
may actually undermine certain stereotypes of disability while reinforcing others. Sarah‟s beauty 
contradicts the belief that disability must correlate with ugliness or asexuality, as I will discuss in 
chapter two, but it may also buttress Hillyer‟s argument. For now, I can only say that the 
discussion of beauty is complicated terrain, in terms of disability, in terms of women, and in 
terms of performance.  
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ownership of one‟s body—and one‟s capacity, or ability, to labor” (4). To be 
independent, therefore, a person must be in full possession and control of her body. 
Subsequently, to be American is to be completely physically and mentally healthy. As 
Garland Thomson asserts, “the principle of self-government demands a regulated body,” 
and disabled bodies are nothing in American culture except defiant (Extraordinary 43). 
From the Declaration of Independence to Puritan attitudes towards the relationship 
between the body and the mind, i.e. “mind over matter,” American culture requires not 
only a functioning body but also an independent one. 
Independence is, of course, intertwined with individualism in the American 
psyche, inextricable from each other, American history, and what it means to be 
American.  The United States, as Russell argues, paradoxically calls for equality amongst 
its citizenship but also champions extraordinary individualism and the “self-made man.” 
Russell writes, “For Tocqueville, America‟s essential difference from other nations was 
located in its egalitarianism,” but it also had a “dangerous tendency toward 
individualism” (30). Russell reveals the contingent paradoxes embedded in this system, 
because while “democratic individualism is founded on the premise of equality and 
sameness of condition” it also valorizes the exceptional and the extraordinary (30). 
Despite this contradiction, writers, politicians, and average citizens “domesticated the 
quality as an essential national virtue” (Russell 30). From the beginning of American 
history then, America has developed a strange relationship to sameness and difference, to 
community and to individualism. America‟s cultural heroes embody this paradox, 
manifesting extraordinary individualism and self-determination while at the same time 
representing a condensation of “America.” Russell cites a small list of American stock 
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characters that exemplify rugged individualism, including “intrepid pioneers, loner 
cowboys, captains of industry, or hard-boiled detectives,” each of which is not only 
desperately individual and independent but also representative of American ideology and 
community (30).  In other words, these symbols of individualism are also symbols of 
community. 
This emphasis on independence, individualism, and self-determination has not left 
the American national psyche. While modern trends towards group therapy and even 
pedagogical group “circles” may suggest that we are shying away from the individual, 
attitudes towards disability indicate that this could not be farther from the truth. Being 
independent is not a matter of choice in America, but a prerequisite. As Peggy Phelan 
asserts about American ideology, “you are welcome here as long as you are productive” 
(11). To be American, then, is to be independent, to have a fully functional body, to be 
extraordinary but certainly not disabled, to be representative of the nation but not 
dependent on others, and, most importantly, to acquiesce to this creed. 
Disabilities and those with them dramatically disrupt this definition of 
Americanness. They “are subverters of an American ideal,” that archetype of 
individualism and independence (Murphy 116). Wendell writes, “to the extent that 
everyone considers independence necessary to respect and self-esteem, those [disabled] 
people will be condemned to be de-valued” (273). In other words, the paradigmatic 
relationship between “independence” and “respect and self-esteem” is not self-evident, 
but constructed through and by our culture. The disabled are weak where Americans 
should be strong, impotent where virility reigns supreme, aged in a culture obsessed with 
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youth, and dependent in a society that not only suggests independence but requires it. 
Murphy writes,  
The disabled serve as constant, visible reminders to the able-bodied that the  
society they live in is shot through with inequity and suffering, that they live in a  
counterfeit paradise, that they too are vulnerable. We represent a fearsome  
possibility. (117) 
In other words, the disabled throw into stark relief the inadequacy and hypocrisy of the 
American value system. The disabled not only “represent a fearsome possibility” 
(Murphy 117), but may “help reveal that those [physical and mental] ideals are not 
„natural‟ or „normal‟ but artificial social creations that oppress everyone” (Wendell 268). 
No body can live up to able-bodied society‟s norms and the disabled highlight this 
inevitability.  
  American ideology and social customs implicitly mandate independence, but 
many laws, especially those regarding disability, overtly authorize either strict 
independence or qualified dependence. Of the 37 million people living in poverty in 2004 
(“Income”), 38% had some kind of disability, whether physical or cognitive (Lustig & 
Strauser 194).  Not only are disabled people three times as likely to live in poverty 
compared to any other group (“About WID”), but there are nearly twice as many 
unemployed disabled people as abled people (“Facts for Features”). Because disabled 
people are less likely to have good educations and jobs, many are circumscribed to 
poverty (“Facts for Features”).  One of the government‟s means of fighting poverty 
among the disabled is work disincentives, tools which give money to the disabled on a 
graduated scale. The purpose of work disincentives is to alleviate poverty amongst the 
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disabled public. If a disabled person makes more than a certain amount of money, the 
earnings disregard, however, federally funded aids, such as nurses or assistants, are 
stripped away. Up to and at the earnings disregard, a disabled person still receives 
funding from the state.  Past the disregard, however, all aid is terminated. The 
predominant problem in this system is that most disabled people will never be able to 
make the kind of money necessary for their exorbitant health costs. As Robert K. Murphy 
asserts, “the disabled are constantly being forced out of the labor market by rules that 
allow no middle ground between total dependency and full independence” (160). The 
laws that stand make it impossible for people with disabilities to not rely on the 
government. In other words, independence for people with disabilities is not merely an 
ideological problem but a legal, visceral, and lived one. 
Most importantly, therefore, America ideals of independence fail to correspond 
with the realities of the disabled populations of America. On the practical level, 
independence is not feasible for many disabled individuals. People with impaired motor 
capacities or with limited speech cannot achieve physical, day-to-day independence.  To 
an extent, even someone like Sarah can never truly be independent in the hearing world. 
She always, even to the play‟s audience, necessitates translation.   
More important than the practical limitations of independence are the damaging 
effects of devaluing dependence and community on disabled bodies and the social body.  
In a culture that upholds and polices independence, its converse is devoutly denigrated. 
Dependence suggests a failure of mind, spirit, and body to overcome.  Wendell writes, 
“to the extent that everyone considers independence necessary to respect and self-esteem, 
those people  [disabled or dependent] will be condemned to be de-valued” (273).  Those 
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who cannot access complete independence are looked upon with pity, aversion, and even 
fear because they reflect the inevitability of disability.
14
 In his memoir, The Body Silent, 
Murphy chronicles his life post-quadriplegia. Murphy becomes plagued by isolation, 
thoughts of suicide, guilt, shame, and worthlessness as he attempts to come to terms with 
his new identity. He writes, “I had changed in my own mind, in my self-image, and in the 
basic conditions of my existence” all because of the denigration of disability and 
dependence (85). As Murphy concludes, “[l]ack of autonomy and unreciprocated 
dependence…[o]verdependency and nonreciprocity are considered childish traits” that 
quite literally eradicate humanity from humans (201). In his memoir, Murphy 
demonstrates the immense trauma related to social perceptions of disability. While 
Murphy works as an anthropologist, a critical researcher and theorist on disabled 
communities, he still suffers from the debasement of disability and dependence. Even 
steeped in the disability rights movement, Murphy cannot escape its prejudices. 
Independence, then, is particularly important to disabled people. In a system that 
denigrates dependence and subsequently shames the disabled, being independent, living 
independently, and counteracting stigmas form the foundation of the disability rights 
movement. Murphy writes that the “escape from dependency has been a central goal of 
the disability political movement” (201) and that “[t]he major goal of the handicapped 
movement is not to foster dependency, but to move the disabled into the mainstream of 
society as autonomous individuals” (158). Davis similarly concludes that “people with 
disabilities cherish independence” and primarily “gather for political action” (162). 
                                               
14
 Samuels cites Lennard J. Davis: “„the disabled body is a direct imago of the repressed 
fragmented body. The disabled body causes a kind of hallucination of the mirror phase gone 
wrong‟” (70). In other words, people with disabilities force the non-disabled to reckon with their 
own fragmentation and to recognize their inevitable literal fragmentation. 
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Independent living groups, for example, are an important part of the disability community  
(Murphy 159). These groups allow the disabled to live relatively independently while still 
offering the care and attention they necessitate.  
Yet, as Murphy suggests, many disabled people live and work together, forming 
symbiotic relationships pivotal to their own survival. Despite an inordinate emphasis on 
independence and masculinity, Murphy unwittingly demonstrates the efficacy of an 
interdependent model. In the first example, Murphy, a paraplegic, drives a car with his 
friend, Mort, who has “recurrent vision problems” (196). With Murphy unable to work 
the pedals, Mort drives. With Mort unable to see, Murphy “warn[s]” Mort “of various 
obstacles, such as stop lights and trucks” (196). While I certainly would not wish to 
encounter this kind of symbiotic driving on the road, Murphy‟s anecdote is a tidy 
example of “individual yet as one.” Operating according to their own strengths, the pair 
forms a mobile union, if only on the drive to work. In another example, Murphy offers 
the living arrangement and relationship between two disabled women. One is a 
quadriplegic “with good upper body strength,” while the “other has cerebral palsy…and 
very limited arm and hand use” (201). Much like Murphy and Mort‟s driving, these two 
women work out a system of living and thriving together. Murphy offers these 
relationships as examples “that [the] escape from dependency,” essentially, 
independence, “has been a central goal of the disability political movement” (201). Yet, 
each of these relationships is certainly more interdependent than independent. Individual 
independence, whether mobility or the right to live uninstitutionalized, is wrought 
through interdependence. So, while independence may be an overt goal of the disability 
rights movement, it is an ideal achieved primarily through the “individual yet as one” 
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model. Independence and interdependence need not be polarized, therefore, but can work 
together to produce new interactions and arrangements for the benefit of all people.  
 
The Deaf Community and Independence 
 
While the question of independence may make for dangerous ground in terms of 
disability, the Deaf community definitively thrives through interdependence and 
networks of relations. As Lane writes, “culturally Deaf people cherish interdependence” 
(162). Since at least the eighteenth century in America, and even earlier in other parts of 
the world, the deaf have banded together, forming languages, cultures, and identities. In 
particular, schools for the deaf played an important part in cementing a cultural identity. 
In the United States, schools for the deaf date back to the early nineteenth century, the 
first being the American Asylum for the Deaf and Dumb chartered in 1817 as a boarding 
school. Practically, these schools were often the only way for most deaf people to meet 
other deaf individuals. Children from rural areas “met other deaf people for the first time 
and learned, also for the first time, how to communicate beyond the level of pantomime 
and gesture” (Baynton 129). While families with deaf members typically created their 
own kind of signed language, schools opened up the possibility of a national language. 
Culling deaf children from across wide swathes of land and disparate and frequently 
isolated backgrounds, these deaf students “encounter[ed] the surprising knowledge that 
they had a history and an identity shared by many others” (Baynton 129). “With the 
creation of this residential school,” a special space for the deaf to assemble, Baynton 
argues, “the deaf in the United States may be said to have become the Deaf” (129). In 
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other words, these schools provided the space for the deaf to form a community and 
thereby a culture.
15
 
 From their inception, residential schools for the deaf have served as the critical 
seat of Deaf culture. At the beginning of their history, these schools instructed their deaf 
pupils through manual means. In other words, they taught them to sign. By the late 
nineteenth century, however, as I discussed earlier, signing fell out of favor and the 
oralist or oral-only pedagogy gained traction. In part, the Deaf community gave rise to 
oralism. Deaf people, of course, did not advocate this route, but their emphasis on 
community, rate of intermarriages, and their language appeared to threaten mainstream, 
American identity. The “image of an insular, inbred, and proliferating deaf community, 
with its own „foreign‟ language and culture, became a potent weapon for the oralist 
cause” (Baynton 140). Baynton argues that the hearing mainstream “insisted that their 
intent was to rescue deaf people from their confinement,” but actually actively worked to 
return deaf people to the American, linguistic mainstream (140). ASL was not only 
designated as substandard, therefore, but alien to American identity. During the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth century, deafness, deaf people, and deaf culture imperiled 
the consolidation of an American identity and people. For much of American history, 
then, Deaf culture and specifically the Deaf community has threatened American modes 
of identifying. Not until the 1970s did schools for the deaf allow signing again (Baynton 
144). 
                                               
15
 Of course, as schools for hearing children were segregated by race so too were schools for the 
deaf. While the Deaf community is obviously far more integrated now, this early segregation 
created distinct delineations and language and practices amongst white and black deaf people. See 
Glenn B. Anderson and Katrina R. Miller‟s "Appreciating Diversity Through Stories About The 
Lives Of Deaf People Of Color" for first person stories about educational obstacles and white 
Deaf privilege.  
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 Despite this embattled history, schools continued to carry on deaf culture. Parents 
would teach their children ASL or “those children who were deaf and attended schools 
where sign language was banned surreptitiously taught others” (Baynton 144). Even 
under repressive conditions, ASL and Deaf culture flourished through these schools. 
Modern schools for the deaf, therefore, not only resist desegregation movements that 
would force the d/Deaf into public schools but also oppose integration into schools of 
varying disabilities. In 2007, the Ohio State Schools for the Deaf and Blind were 
supposed to merge, but protests from deaf students and alumni argued that the merger 
would “„destroy the deaf school‟s culture‟” (qtd. in Brueggeman 12). Schools for the deaf 
do not merely symbolize deaf culture or deaf history, a waning reminder of what 
Deafness used to be, but continue to revitalize and rework what it means to be Deaf. 
Their continued importance cannot be minimized given the threat of cochlear implants 
and mainstreaming. 
 Moreover, many d/Deaf individuals continue to congregate in social groups well 
into adulthood. In particular, social clubs played an important role in formulating and 
disseminating Deaf culture. For those who matriculated in schools that forbid ASL or 
others who were mainstreamed in public schools, these groups act as a point of access to 
learn ASL and Deaf culture (Baynton 144). And for those who perhaps matured with 
Deaf culture, these clubs continue to serve as “Deaf places and points of transmission of 
Deaf culture” (Senghas & Monaghan 79). As Senghas and Monaghan assert, “finding or 
establishing places have been explicit goals for many deaf individuals” (79). Unlike other 
ethnicities or races, the Deaf have no place. They can neither cite a home space nor return 
to it. Scattered across towns, counties, and states, the American Deaf use clubs to 
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congregate, to socialize, and, most importantly, to carve a tangible space for themselves 
and their bodies. Like schools, Deaf clubs create and share Deaf community. 
Perhaps more important than the strong sense of community is in the communal 
way that many deaf individuals identify. As Couser writes, “the „deaf way‟ of 
communicating is not entirely, or necessarily, a matter of using sign language; rather it 
involves relational identification…informality and interactivity” (Recovering 228). In 
particular, this “relational identification” or “presenting oneself by reference to one‟s 
parents and often one‟s school” is important to formulating self-identity (Recovering 
228).  Naming, for example, is a communal process. While deaf people are almost always 
given an English name, which they will fingerspell to interested parties, most have name 
signs, a sign particular to the individual derived from his or her personality, interests, or 
characteristics, typically received at school (Through Deaf Eyes). The very act of naming, 
therefore, is communal, generated and activated by other Deaf people. In this way, 
“interactivity” forms the basis of all communications amongst the Deaf (Recovering 228). 
In one sense, “interactivity” refers to the collaboration of “the hands and body” in any 
ASL utterance (Senghas & Monaghan 74). ASL is not merely the fluttering of hands, but 
the conjunction of signing and facial expression across a spatial plane. Furthermore, the 
ASL speaker must also collude with her audience to make meaning, forming another 
facet of “interactivity.” Working together, such as in the case of naming, signs and 
meanings evolve. From “relational identification” to “interactivity,” Deafness, Deaf 
culture, and Deaf people are utterly steeped in community, understanding themselves and 
the world through networks of relations. 
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In many ways, then, D/deaf people threaten that American ideal of independence. 
Their emphasis on community and relational identification undermine the perceived 
superiority of individualism and independence. Moreover, the cultural construction of 
Deafness at least partially insists on isolation or separation from the hearing, American 
mainstream (Senghas & Monaghan 80). Those tenets that undergird American ideology 
are not only unimportant, but, for the most part, antithetical to Deaf culture.  To be a Deaf 
American then might be a paradox. 
 
Conclusion 
 
To be Deaf then is to embody Sarah‟s monologue that I began this chapter with. 
Sarah signs,  
For example, the sign “to connect,” a simple sign—but it means so much more 
when it is moved between us like this. Now it means to be joined in a shared 
relationship, to be individual yet as one. A whole concept just like that. (89) 
Here, Sarah literally champions the efficacy of ASL. In the previous lines, she argues that 
she perhaps is better at communicating than hearing people because of ASL. ASL, unlike 
English, as she explains, condenses layers of meaning into one sign; “a whole concept 
just like that” (89). In exploring the efficacy and eloquence of ASL, Sarah deconstructs 
the disability construction of deafness and validates and uplifts the cultural model. She 
suggests that deafness is not merely a biological mishap that necessitates pathologizing, 
but  is “one range within the larger spectrum of human variations” (Senghas & Monaghan 
78).  
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Her speech is not only a validation of herself and her language, therefore, but also 
an argument for the Deaf mode of identification. Sarah continues, signing, 
Well, I want to be joined to other people, but for all my life people have spoken 
for me: She says; she means; she wants. As if there were no I. As if there were no 
one in here who could understand. Until you let me be an individual, an I, just as 
you are, you will never truly be able to come inside my silence and know me. And 
until you can do that, I will never let myself know you. Until that time, we cannot 
be joined. We cannot share a relationship. (89) 
Once again, Sarah counteracts the disability construction of deafness, particularly in its 
assertion that she, as a disabled person, is without humanity, personality, quite literally, 
an “I.” Moreover, Sarah cries for both independence and inter-dependence in her 
“individual yet as one” speech. She wants her voice to be heard, an understandable and 
important claim considering the historical silencing of the deaf. But, she also wants to 
imagine and introduce a different way of conceiving personal identity. The sign “to 
connect,” as Sarah argues, not only condenses multiple meanings into one symbol, but 
also introduces a different mode of conceiving self-identification, one much more aligned 
with Deaf culture. While Sarah asserts her “I,” an independence that I have argued is 
important to disabled people and the able-bodied American public alike, she 
predominantly does so to assert a kind of communal identification. She claims she needs 
to be an “I” and others need to recognize her humanity before they will “be able to come 
inside [her] silence” (89). Before she can truly engage in a dynamic relationship with 
someone, anyone, they must recognize her as a person and as an equal. Her assertion of 
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independence, therefore, is uniquely tied to other people. She wants to be independent 
precisely so she can form relationships.  
Her definition “to be individual yet as one,” then, suggests a new mode of 
identifying, one based in Deaf culture. Because community, interdependence, and 
relational identification are much more important than the individual in Deaf culture, 
Sarah argues that relationships, and specifically her relationship with James, could stand 
to learn from this model. “[T]o be individual yet as one” is to be a unique, equal, and 
human person, but to also be joined to others in a interdependent network and to 
recognize this rhizomatic web.  
Sarah, therefore, explicitly contests and expands American modes of identifying. 
In a nation that demands independence and exalts the individual, many more of its 
citizens, including the deaf and disabled, are excluded than included in the national 
community. Even those citizens who, for a time, pass as able-bodied are facing entropy. 
Their youth will fade, their joints will stiffen, and they will come to realize that the 
United States is not constructed for everyone but for a minority population of the able-
bodied: the young, the fit, the healthy, and the independent. Wendell writes “to the extent 
that everyone considers independence necessary to respect and self-esteem, those people 
[with disabilities] will be condemned to be de-valued” (273). Yet, we all will have some 
kind of disability if even simple advanced age. Under this ideology, all Americans are 
destined to loathe themselves and their bodies.  
Sarah‟s reinscription of what it means to be American, then, could not be more 
appropriate. Such American archetypes as “the self-made man” or “the rugged 
individual” quickly collapse under the scrutiny of Deaf tenets and Sarah‟s model of 
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personhood. Signing to a hearing, American audience, Sarah expands what it means to be 
American, suggesting that all people are embedded in networks of relations and that no 
one is truly independent or individual. She makes room for Americans to identify as 
dependent, interdependent, and community-oriented, writing herself and countless others 
into the national narrative. Sarah suggests that if Americans were to recognize the 
constellations of people, places, and even things that comprise their lives, independence 
would not be prized so highly and dependence and interdependence not denigrated. 
Accepting a communal model of identifying would not only alleviate the pressure to be 
independent that plagues disabled and Deaf people, but would allow many more 
Americans to begin to love themselves and their own bodies. 
Sarah embodies pride where the American value system says she should have 
none, courage where she should be weak, and, frankly, ebullient where she should be 
disconsolate. Sarah, in many ways, is a hero to those living in and through anomalous 
bodies. She stands in and for all those who have been rejected, stereotyped, stigmatized, 
and oppressed by an ideology that deems them weak, wrong, insufficient, and, 
sometimes, evil. Most importantly, Sarah suggests that there is no one way to be 
American, to be Deaf, to be disabled, or as we will see in the next chapter, to be a 
woman.  
 
 
“created in my image”: Disability, Gender, & Subversion 
 
 While the previous chapter was devoted to Sarah‟s Deaf identity and the ways in 
which this undermines American identity, much of the play is invested in the progression 
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and complexity of Sarah‟s identity and her inability to be simplified into one particular 
role or characteristic. When Orin realizes that Sarah is going to marry James, he lashes 
out at her, claiming “You go with him and you‟ll still be a maid. His maid!” (41). In yet 
another scene, James, now Sarah‟s husband, tells her, “I don‟t know which role you‟re 
playing here. Is this Sarah the Pure Deaf Person, or Sarah Norman, the old isolationist 
maid, or is this Sarah Leeds, teammate of James?” (75).  As I have argued, Orin and 
James represent the polarized Deaf and Hearing worlds, Sarah‟s past and potential future. 
It seems important, moreover, that each of these characters is a man. While Orin insists 
that Sarah will remain a maid if she marries James, James similarly attempts to reduce 
her identity to a single title: “the Pure Deaf Person,” “the old isolationist maid,” or the 
“teammate of James” (75). Each of these men wants to make her over in his own image, 
whether as a hearing person or as a Deaf one, usurping her singular right to define 
herself. 
 Rather than focus solely on Deafness, therefore, I would also like to examine the 
ways in which Sarah‟s gender shapes and informs her relationships and identity. In 
particular, I will explore the intersections of gender and disability and how these 
overlapping identities shape Sarah‟s personhood in ways different from either able-
bodied women or disabled men. Disabled women are not only doubly alienated from the 
prototypical American body, but they also face different obstacles in regards to sexuality 
and beauty than their male disabled counterparts. Throughout the play, Sarah grapples 
with what it means to be a disabled woman. As a teenager, she reverts to her sexuality to 
establish herself as an attractive woman in a culture that demands beauty of its women 
while simultaneously defining this ideal as narrowly as possible. As a woman, Sarah 
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resists the domination and independence inherent in the audist and patriarchal world. 
Instead, she rebels by refusing to speak and by offering her communal model of 
identification. Her relationship and marriage to James, however, complicates her integrity 
as Deaf, as a woman, and as independent. While she uses the marriage much like she uses 
her early sexuality, to reclaim her female identity, this charade fails. By the end of the 
play, she disavows the patriarchal, ableist, and nationalist systems of power that work to 
denigrate her and her experiences. Instead, she asserts her model for human interaction, 
“individual yet as one.” While Orin and James attempt to reduce and define her, Sarah 
realizes that she herself must resist dominating others, a process of subordination inherent 
in audism and patriarchy. She cannot make James, the hearing man, and Orin, the Deaf 
activist, over in her own image either. Instead, she suggests an alternative meeting place 
between silence and sound, man and woman. While binaries inherently breed a system of 
privilege, Sarah‟s complex subject position—a disabled woman—attests to the 
proliferation of identities, thereby refining her model for identification and interaction. 
 
Disabled Women: Bodies, Beauty, and Sexuality 
 
 As Sarah discovers throughout the play, being disabled and being a woman place 
her in a “doubly oppressed” position (Asch and Fine 241). Susan Wendell argues that 
“[d]isabled women struggle with both the oppressions of being women in male-
dominated societies and the oppressions of being disabled in societies dominated by the 
able-bodied” (261). Much of my previous chapter can be reviewed again in terms of 
Sarah‟s status as a woman. James‟ attempts to make Sarah speak are not merely a product 
of audism and paternalism but blatant and dangerous sexism, as I will discuss later in this 
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chapter. Moreover, Orin‟s paternalism seems more dangerous given the fact that he is a 
man and Sarah is a woman. I will resist the temptation to merely “review” the previous 
chapter, but here and elsewhere I would like to suggest that Sarah‟s Deafness and her 
gender are delicately intertwined.  
Although there are many correlations between disability and feminist studies, the 
most obvious one is “the body.” Both women and people with disabilities deviate from an 
imagined, bodily norm. Wendell writes, 
Our real human bodies are exceedingly diverse…Yet we do not absorb or reflect 
this simple fact in our culture. Instead, we idealize the human body. Our physical 
ideals change from time to time, but we always have ideals. These ideals are not 
just about appearance; they are also ideals of strength and energy and proper 
control of the body. (268) 
 Despite the fact that bodies vary, whether in sex or ability, hair texture or skin color, all 
cultures and particularly American culture maintain ideals of what its citizens should look 
like. Moreover, these ideals are inextricable from virtues. Beautiful people are good 
people. They are disciplined, healthy, and in control of their bodies and their futures. 
People who deviate or differ, therefore, are not only considered unattractive but 
intractable, malevolent, and even un-American. 
While all people with disabilities are maligned under this system, the idealized 
body doubly afflicts disabled women. Their bodies represent deviations from multiple 
imagined norms because they are neither male nor able-bodied. Simply put, the 
difference between men and women is primarily physical. Their bodily differentiation, 
however, has served to exalt men and denigrate women. Garland Thomson traces this 
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history to Aristotle‟s assertion that the female body is that of a “„deformed‟” or “„a 
mutilated male‟” (qtd. in “Feminist Theory” 280). Essentially, women were disabled 
men.
16
 While this bodily correlation may no longer hold widespread validity, modern 
women‟s identities are arguably more tied to their bodies than their male counterparts 
(Wendell 268). Before becoming disabled, Wendell writes that she “was one of those 
people who felt „close enough‟ to cultural ideals to be reasonably accepting of [her] 
body” (267). While she “was aware of some alienation” from her body, being a feminist, 
she “knew in [her] heart that too much of [her] liking still depended on being „close 
enough‟” (267). Wendell implies that her love for her body is directly linked to her ability 
to pass, to being “„close enough‟” to that cultural ideal to still be considered attractive 
(267). Even a woman well informed on issues of sex and gender cannot divorce bodily 
integrity from cultural ideals. As Wendell suggests, almost every woman, disabled or 
otherwise, grapples with physical integrity in a culture oversaturated with narrow images 
of what it means to be beautiful. Becoming disabled, however, doubly estranges Wendell 
from her body, forcing her to finally see and understand the strenuous pressures of 
physical ideals. Disabled women, therefore, face far greater pressure than either able-
bodied women or disabled men. In a culture that exalts beauty, health, and physical 
fitness, and judges women‟s bodies far more harshly than men‟s, disabled women can 
never escape their bodies. “Facing” their own bodies and loving them becomes nearly 
impossible (Signifying 8). 
                                               
16 This assertion, however, is vexed. Many feminist scholars haphazardly rely on disabilities to 
metaphorically indict patriarchy. They claim the damages of patriarchal institutions mentally and 
physically disfigure women. This rhetorical move may further obscure disability and its 
particulars. See Ellen Samuels‟ “Critical Divides: Judith Butler's Body Theory and the Question 
of Disability” for a more extensive analysis of disability and feminist studies. 
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 Despite being circumscribed by their bodies, many disabled women discover that 
their disabilities rob them of the sexuality and attractiveness typically inextricable from 
able-bodied women. Asch and Fine argue that  “[t]he woman with a disability, whether 
apparent or invisible, may display less than the norm or the fantasied ideal of bodily 
integrity, grace, and ease” (244). Because American women “„must look a certain way to 
be loved and admired, to be worth anything,‟” disabled women are all but barred from 
accessing beauty, love, sexuality, and relationships (qtd. in Asch & Fine 244). For 
example, when a woman with spina bifida asked her gynecologist if she could engage in 
“satisfying” sexual intercourse, the doctor replied “„Don‟t worry, honey, your vagina will 
be tight enough to satisfy any man‟” (qtd. in Asch & Fine 248). As Asch and Fine 
sarcastically claim, “Her satisfaction probably didn‟t cross his mind” (248). In a culture 
that defines female physical beauty so narrowly yet so specifically, disabled women can 
never fulfill its requirements. They can never be beautiful and subsequently can never be 
sexual. Instead, they are left to languish in a culture that deems them ugly, sexually 
bereft, and, frankly, impotence-inducing.
17
  
 Sarah, however, resists this reductive depiction of herself. In a conversation with 
James, Mrs. Norman reveals how popular a young Sarah was with her hearing sister‟s 
friends, particularly the boys. She claims, “These boys really liked Sarah, treated her the 
same way they treated Ruth, with respect and…and if you didn‟t know there was a 
problem, you‟d have thought she was perfectly normal” (29). When James presses Sarah 
on the issue, however, Sarah divulges, “At first I let them have me because they would. 
                                               
17 While physical disabilities are typically connected with asexuality, mental or cognitive 
disorders are usually correlated with hypersexuality. Either way, people with disabilities fall 
under deviant sexualities. See Robert McRuer‟s “Compulsory Able-Bodieness and 
Queer/Disabled Existence” and Alison Kafer‟s “Compulsory Bodies: Reflections on 
Heterosexuality and Able-bodiedness” for more. 
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Sex was something I could do as well as hearing girls. Better! It got to be that when I 
went home, the boys would be lined up on a waiting list my sister kept for me” (31).  
While her mother believed and perhaps continues to believe that these dates were 
normalizing her, helping her pass in the hearing world, Sarah suggests that she honed her 
sexuality as a weapon to combat “hearing girls” and the pervasive assumption that she 
was less than them, less beautiful, less sexually appealing, and less a person (31). For 
better or worse, her sexuality became the foundation by which she defined herself as 
attractive and sexual. Sarah‟s sexual revels, therefore, represent a reclamation of the very 
same sexuality that American culture claims as antithetical to disabled women.  
 
Ability, National Identity, and Gender as Sites of Oppression and Transgression 
 
 In many ways, Sarah‟s early sexuality also represents an assertion of her 
independence as a Deaf woman. While women and people with disabilities have faced 
comparable bodily-based oppression, Wendell also suggests that feminists and disability 
activists face similar issues in their political agendas. In particular, Wendell argues that 
one of the problems facing both groups, which should align them more closely to work 
together, is  
whether to place great value on independence from the help of other people, as 
the dominant culture does, or to question a value-system which distrusts and 
devalues dependence on other people and vulnerability in general. (261)  
The question of independence/dependence pervades disability and feminist literature and 
theories, but, as Wendell implies, there is no unilateral support behind either course of 
action.  
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 While I have discussed the meaning of independence in terms of hearing 
American culture and the tenets of interrelatedness that govern Deaf communities, I 
would like to reiterate and then shift the frame of reference on the independence/ 
dependence binary to disabled women. To revisit briefly, independence is pivotal to 
American identity, both a pervasive part of our mythological landscape and a requisite for 
legal and political citizenship. Independence, however, is not merely an American tenet, 
but central to patriarchy and ableism as well. Independence is the defining characteristic 
of American, masculinity, and able-bodiedness. The prototypical American is not only 
male but masculine in qualities: independent and self-sufficient. To be self-sufficient, to 
be a true American, moreover, one must be able-bodied, able to labor mentally and 
physically. National identity, masculinity, and able-bodiedness are intricately interwoven 
around that ideal of independence. 
In America, therefore, dependence is devoutly denigrated. As Wendell succinctly 
writes, “Dependence on the help of others is humiliating in a society which prizes 
independence” (273).  In the last chapter, I suggested that independence is untenable for 
most disabled people. Independence is certainly important, especially in terms of the 
waning self-esteem of the newly disabled, for example, yet not every person is able to 
physically or mentally access “independence.” Many disabled people do and must rely on 
others for help and care. As I argued last chapter, dependence need not be stigmatized, 
therefore. Rather, a communal model of human interaction can and should be 
implemented for the well-being of all people. In this chapter, I would like to suggest that 
American culture not only conflates disability with stigmatized dependence, but that 
women are also incorporated in this unholy triad. When patriarchy, ableism, and 
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nationalism exalt independence, mental acuity, and physical strength, the disabled and 
women, purported opposites of these ideals, represent dangerous transgressions.  
The question of independence/dependence for disabled men and disabled women, 
therefore, differs. In his memoir The Body Silent, Robert K. Murphy argues that the onset 
of his quadriplegia represents the complete cessation of his independence and thereby his 
masculinity (95-98). While still able to work as a professor and researcher, he can no 
longer fulfill his role as patriarch. His disability robs him of his ability to perform such 
masculine, independent tasks as changing a light bulb or engaging in sexual intercourse 
with his wife. He writes, “For the male, the weakening and atrophy of the body threaten 
all the cultural values of masculinity: strength, activeness, virility, stamina, and fortitude” 
(94-95). In Murphy‟s mind and in American culture, Murphy‟s disablement obliterates 
his independence and thereby his masculinity. 
While Murphy suggests that disablement “compromise[s]” a man‟s 
“standing…far more than” a woman‟s, he fails to recognize that if women are less 
“compromised” it is only because society already considers them disabled by virtue of 
being not male (96). Men risk losing their masculinity in becoming disabled, but Asch 
and Fine suggest that “our culture views being female and disabled as “„redundant‟” 
(249). Good women should be passive, obedient, and genial, all traits which are similarly 
ascribed to those with disabilities. As Asch and Fine argue, “disability is thought to 
reinforce…customary female characteristics” (243). While disabled men may lose the 
independence necessary for American masculinity, disabled women are “[e]xempted 
from the „male‟ productive role,” by nature of their biological sex and stripped of “the 
„female‟ nurturing one” (Asch & Fine 241). These women, Asch and Fine conclude, are 
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“doubly oppressed,” twice removed from their bodies because of their sex and ability 
(241). They are circumscribed by both patriarchy and ableism, twice removed from the 
cultural norm and therefore twice as likely to be scorned and stigmatized. 
I will therefore argue that patriarchy, ableism, and nationalism are interlocking 
systems of oppression, both within the play and in lived experiences. Each exalts 
independence at the expense of those who deviate. Disabled women, in their multiple 
deviations, bear the brunt of this oppression. In particular, Hillyer argues that, 
disabled women…have more than average contact with patriarchal institutions 
and less than average choice about the ones with which they interact. These 
typically include medicine in many of its subinstitutions: government, including 
law, welfare, and other social service departments; education; and religion. (14). 
Disabled women, therefore, are circumscribed by “patriarchal institutions” (14). As 
Hillyer suggests, “Often these institutions overlap, as in treatment facilities operated by 
churches that also offer public school special education classes under their auspices” 
(14). These are not merely “patriarchal institutions,” then, but nationally or state-funded 
programs dedicated to maintaining its able-bodied agenda. Moreover, “Women seeking 
access to treatment,” that would otherwise be unavailable, “must accept the whole 
„package‟ in such situations” (Hillyer 14). Disabled women have “less than average 
choice” and are forced to submit to these institutions so far removed from their own 
experiences (Hillyer 14). 
 What Asch and Fine reveal, however, is that while disability studies has 
exhaustively examined the ways in which disability and its stigmatization strip 
independence and self-sufficiency from the disabled, much of this analysis is not only 
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reserved for males and male characters in terms of literary analysis but continues to exalt 
masculine, patriarchal, and heteronormative modes of living in the world. Yet, as Asch 
and Fine suggest, disabled women occupy an interesting and even “ freer‟” space (241). 
Liberated from both masculine and feminine conventions, they may have more 
opportunities to critique mainstream culture. Garland Thomson asserts that “disabled 
women operate as embodied alternatives to the status quo” (113). Their beings and their 
bodies denounce “social rules and categories,” opening up new spaces, definitions, and 
identities (113). Disabled women, therefore, contest the rigidity and necessity of 
independence. While independence implies singularity and self-sufficiency, all 
characteristics which mainstream America exalts, those on the margins of this national 
narrative, such as women, people with disabilities, and those who identify as anything 
other than “heterosexual,” contest this narrative. Rather, they and their bodies insist on 
plurality instead of singularity, subversion instead of dominance, proliferation rather than 
reduction, and boundaries and borders instead of centers. While ableism and patriarchy 
posit one, traditional, and authoritative way of living in and through the world, women, 
and particularly, disabled women attest to the proliferating multiplicity of deviant and 
different lives.  
 
Sarah as Transgressor 
 
 Sarah, in particular, resists hegemony, both in her body and her actions, acting as 
an “embodied alternative to the status quo” (Extraordinary 113). Just as early feminists 
rejected symbols of patriarchy, so too does Sarah. Early in her childhood, Sarah defiantly 
rebuffs religion, specifically Christianity. When James coerces Sarah into listening to his 
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records, she refuses because she abhors that “kind of music”—organs (66). James seems 
surprised that she can identify the instrument, but Sarah explains her antipathy, signing, 
When we were kids in school here, on Sunday they made us go to church. They 
played an organ fiercely. Orin cried because he could hear just enough for it to 
hurt his ears. The kids with hearing aids were forbidden to turn them off. We were 
told it was the voice of God and should hurt. They said we should love God for 
being so fierce and demanding. When Orin was nine and I was eleven, we started 
hiding in trees behind the duck pond on Sunday. We pretended we were soldiers 
and threw dirt clods at the church and made sounds like hand grenades. (66) 
Sarah‟s story reveals some of the particulars of deaf history and of deaf education in the 
United States. The rise of schools for the deaf during the nineteenth century undoubtedly 
coincides with American religious revivals. Teaching the deaf a language, any language, 
was imperative for the salvation of their souls. As Baynton suggests, the deaf were not 
necessarily pitied because they could not hear or learn as others could, but because they 
were estranged, quite literally severed from Christianity (134). As nineteenth-century 
Christians set out to foreign lands to evangelize perceived heathens, the deaf became a 
national symbol of savagery that necessitated civilizing. They needed to be Christianized 
at any cost, as Orin and Sarah discover, even at the painful price of a screeching hearing 
aid and splitting headache.
18
 
                                               
18
 The recent documentary Mea Maxima Culpa: Silence in the House of God chronicles the sex 
abuse scandals of the Catholic Church. The bulk of the movie investigates the history of sex 
abuse in the Catholic church, tracing cover-ups across the world and time, ultimately indicting the 
most recent Pope as an abettor to pederasty. In the movie, various ex-clergymen suggest that sex 
abuse is not only prevalent but endemic in the Catholic church because of the cult of the 
priesthood and power psychoses. While certainly incendiary in that regard, the documentary is 
framed by the story of a Catholic school for the deaf in Milwaukee. For years, the charismatic 
Catholic priest who ran the school routinely molested students. He even implemented a hierarchy 
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 Christianity has posed similar problems to other disabilities as well. For one, as 
Couser posits, the symbolic paradigm of disability, that which reads disability as a 
“stable, legible, and reliable sign of a moral condition or divine disfavor,” is tied to the 
“Judeo-Christian scriptures” (Signifying 21). Throughout the bible, illness, disease, and 
disability are almost always linked to evil, sin, demonic forces, and the Devil. Hence, 
Jesus Christ‟s redemptive power is literally constructed through the healed bodies of the 
diseased and disabled (Signifying 21-22). The symbolic paradigm, supported and 
promulgated by Chrisitanity, posits disability or illness as an unqualified mark of inner 
malevolence or godly retribution. In this signifying system, people with disabilities are 
confined by the limits of social perception. 
Many people with disabilities, therefore, reconcile themselves to their situations 
through Christianity, religion, and spirituality. In his taxonomy of disability life writing, 
Couser argues that one of the modes of disability autobiography is “the rhetoric of 
spiritual compensation” (36). In this rhetoric, the disabled person only comes to terms 
with her life and body through recourse to God. Couser writes, “she can only be certain 
of her personhood—which for her is somehow compromised by her disability—when it 
                                                                                                                                            
of older students to choose and “break in” new victims. While much of the movie is devoted to 
the conspiracy of the Catholic church to silence victims and pedophiles, the movie‟s keen focus 
on the school for the deaf, the framing of the tale, and the final image/line of the movie suggest 
that the movie is equally as invested in forwarding Deaf culture and disability studies. Other 
schools for the deaf around the world experienced similar problems. Students, however, were 
rarely believed. Not only were Catholic priests not to be crossed, but many of these deaf students 
signed while their parents could not. In many cases, these priests acted as translators between 
deaf children and parents. Moreover, the Milwaukee tale of abuse coincides with widespread 
misunderstandings of Deafness. People thought these Deaf students were also cognitively 
impaired. When they confessed to the priest‟s actions, the people who heard these complaints 
thought they were lying, acting out, causing trouble, ungrateful, or any number of hostile 
stereotypes. The final image/line of the movie is one of these victims, simply signing and 
speaking “Deaf power.” Combatting the Catholic church, which has proved nearly impossible, 
represents both a victory for victims of pedophilia but also an important step in acknowledging 
Deaf people and Deaf culture. Both have been silenced for far too long. 
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has been conferred and confirmed by divine authority” (37). The only way to overcome 
the symbolic correlation between disability and malignance is through God. While this 
rhetoric may serve personal fulfillment and validation, it posits disability as a personal 
“problem—a challenge given…by God for his own inscrutable reasons—not a social or 
political matter” (Couser 38). The rhetoric of spiritual compensation, therefore, makes 
political action or change unnecessary. If disability is a personal, spiritual problem, 
systemic change is pointless.   
In a sense, then, Christianity has been used to placate those with disabilities, 
quelling any sense of indignation or rebellion.While religion may offer a means to 
understand the vicissitudes of fate and time, its danger is its unchecked power. As Hillyer 
argues, those institutions that serve the disabled are frequently tied to religion (14). 
Christianity is complicit in nationalism, sexism, and ableism. Those people that need care 
are forced to endure indoctrination and aversion for the sake of their health or education 
as the case may be. In some instances, then, Christianity and religion itself, can prevent 
people with disabilities from challenging the various establishments in place, whether 
they be patriarchal, heteronormative, or ableist.  
Orin and Sarah, however, rebel against these systems. They transform their 
horrific, Christian experiences into staged revolutions.  After a time, they “started hiding 
in trees behind the duck pond on Sunday,” circumventing the mandatory services (66). 
They not only escaped Church, but enacted their own rebellions, pretending to be soldiers 
hurling “dirt clod” grenades at the incendiary building (66). Despite their young age, 
Sarah and Orin understand the systems at work to oppress them and actively take up 
imaginative and metaphorical arms to overthrow them. Sarah, therefore, is not a victim of 
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ableism, patriarchy, or national identity, but the fruition of Garland Thomson‟s reading of 
the disabled woman‟s body, an embodiment of “alternatives to the status quo” (113). 
 While chucking dirt may have been a slightly underwhelming rebellion, Sarah‟s 
most important insurrection is her trenchant refusal to speak. While I have discussed this 
at length in the previous chapter, I would like to use Sarah‟s identity as a woman to 
further unpack the violence of James‟ repeated attempts.19 From the onset, their 
relationship is embedded in power dynamics: Sarah is deaf and James is hearing, she is a 
woman and he is man, she is a janitor while he is a teacher. Undoubtedly, James is 
positioned in a culturally superior role, invested with power and authority. When the pair 
meet, Franklin, the school‟s president/principal, asks, or rather commands, James to take 
Sarah on in his “spare time” (4). As the speech teacher, James‟ mission therefore is to 
coerce the recalcitrant Sarah to speak. While James is certainly not an evil man, he does 
not understand how dangerous and violent his repeated attempts to make Sarah speak 
truly are. One Deaf person argues, “If you want to change ASL or take ASL away from 
the person, you are trying to take his or her identity away. I believe „my language is me.‟ 
To reject a language is to reject the deaf person” (qtd. in Humphries 14). James‟ attempts, 
therefore, represent a violation of her identity as a Deaf woman. More urgently, James‟ 
physical coercions appear analogous to other bodily violations, including rape. Bearing in 
mind the power dynamics at play in their relationship, James‟ attempts to make Sarah 
speak are intrusive and threatening. In making Sarah speak, James takes away her choice, 
strips her of power, and usurps her right to bodily integrity and control. 
                                               
19
 It is nearly impossible to divorce Sarah‟s identity from her Deaf one, and I certainly wouldn‟t 
propose such an undertaking. Both ableism and sexism work on her person, in similar yet 
different and overlapping ways. In this chapter, I see myself peeling apart rather than divorcing 
Sarah‟s gendered identity from her Deaf one.  
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 Unlike James, Sarah seems to understand the kinds of power at work within their 
incredibly disparate subject positions. When Sarah continues to refuse to speak, even 
after their first date, James psychoanalyzes her. First, he concludes that her “hatred of 
hearing people” is actually self-loathing (30). When Sarah pointedly claims that his 
hackneyed diagnosis “sounds like it came straight out of a textbook,” James then suggests 
that her refusal to speak has something to do with the boys from her childhood (30). Like 
most of the hearing world, James simply cannot understand why she would not want to 
talk, to be able to function in the hearing world. Her refusal to speak is not psychological, 
but a choice. When James cries “Let me help you, damn it!,” like the paternalist he is, 
Sarah quickly retorts, “How—by showing me the joys of sex with a hearing man?” (31).  
Rather than recognizing the acerbic validity of Sarah‟s deduction, James merely quips “I 
don‟t see you making yourself available for that kind of therapy. I think that‟s one 
language you don‟t speak” (31). Not only does James reiterate the dominant narrative of 
disabled women as unattractive and un- or a-sexual, he also seems to validate sex as a 
“kind of therapy” (31). While he undoubtedly jokes, the danger of the witticism is 
compounded by the reality of their date. His coercions coincide with a romantic event, 
once again conflating speaking with bodily violation. Unlike James, Sarah perceives the 
threat that their date and his joke pose. Her exclusion from “the cultural center” allows 
her to more clearly identify its power and influence and to ground herself in opposition to 
this normativity—that is, until she marries James (Extraordinary 115).  
 
Sarah and Marriage: Disrupting and Informing Transgression 
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Despite Sarah‟s keen perception, these powerful systems and people continue to 
attempt to control her. While all disabled people tend to be read by their disability than 
by any of their various other identifiers, disabled women face this problem more directly. 
In many ways, disabled women cease to be women. Despite the fact that Sarah embodies 
a unique subject position, a Deaf woman, almost every character in the play wants to 
reduce her identity to a set of uncomplicated parts. Orin pulls her towards the Deaf world 
and James the Hearing. James‟ lure might be stronger as the pair falls in love and is 
married. Their marriage, however, is fraught, particularly for James. Even after their 
wedding, James continues his attempts to quantify Sarah. He questions, “I don‟t know 
which role you‟re playing here. Is this Sarah the Pure Deaf Person, or Sarah Norman, the 
old isolationist maid, or is this Sarah Leeds, teammate of James?” (75).  James not only 
suggests that Sarah can only play one role in her life, but implies that each of these titles 
are mutually exclusive.
20
 The culturally Deaf Sarah could in no way be his wife Sarah. In 
other words, he sees her disability at odds with her womanhood. Or, perhaps more 
accurately, he considers her “old” personality unfit for her new status as his wife. In 
many ways, James attempts to reduce Sarah‟s identity: She can be Deaf or his wife, but 
she cannot be both. In his mind, their marriage should initiate a new, better identity. 
While James believes their marriage should improve Sarah, Sarah does disover 
that it challenges and even changes how she defines herself and her beliefs. In part, this 
dilemma arises from her status as a disabled woman. Marriage symbolizes the status quo 
and thereby threatens Sarah‟s rebellion, identity, and body. While Asch and Fine suggest 
that disabilities might liberate women from traditional female roles, such as wife and 
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 I will revisit this scene again in chapter three to discuss the performative nature of Sarah‟s 
identity and, in particular, Deafness, and the ways in which performative identities and the genre 
build fluid roles and community. 
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mother, the primary impetus of their research is to discover why so few disabled women 
marry or reproduce (241). They suggest that disabled women 
have not been „trapped‟ by many of the social expectations feminists have 
challenged. They have not been forced to get married or to subordinate paid work 
to childrearing or housekeeping. Instead, they have been warned by parents that 
men only „take advantage‟; they have been sterilized by force or „choice,‟ rejected 
by disabled and non-disabled heterosexual and lesbian partners, abandoned by 
spouses after onset of disability, and thwarted when they seek to mother. (254) 
Because disability may seem to undermine women‟s sexuality, attractiveness, and other 
traditionally feminine traits, such as emotional and physical caretaking, disabled women 
are far less likely to marry and reproduce, far more likely to divorce, and more frequently 
barred from adopting than either able-bodied women or disabled men (Asch & Fine 242). 
Disabilities not only rob women of their attractiveness and sexuality but of that 
traditional femininity that others perhaps take for granted.  
Sarah‟s self-perception is undoubtedly threatened by the marriage. After all, her 
Deafness is corrupted by her relationship to the hearing James. Given the cultural 
problems that Asch and Fine outline, however, marriage may serve as another means for 
Sarah to grounds herself as attractive, sexual, and nurturing. When Orin discovers that 
Sarah will be leaving the school to marry James, he rails at her, crying “You go with him 
you‟ll still be a maid. His maid!” (41).  Orin‟s anger undoubtedly derives from the 
complications that Sarah‟s marriage to a hearing man will prove for his burgeoning deaf 
rights movement. When Sarah marries James, a hearing man, she will move farther 
outside of strict Deaf culture and closer to the hearing mainstream. Her performance of 
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her Deaf identity is called into question, and, in Orin‟s mind, tainted by this unholy 
pairing. While Orin‟s antipathy towards the situation is fraught with audism, paternalism, 
and even sexism, he highlights a very important aspect of many marriages of disabled 
women. When Orin suggests that Sarah will only be James‟ maid, he reveals a trend 
amongst disabled women to assume traditional models of femininity. Because disability 
strips women of those feminine qualities that may make many feel needed, attractive, or 
purposeful, they reject all of that which may make them masculine or even more Other 
than they already are (Asch & Fine 249-51). In particular, Wendell discusses the “shame 
and loss of self-esteem” rampant in women who become disabled in their adult lives, 
abruptly forcing them to move from positions of caregiving to care-receiving (273).  For 
women who have constructed their identities around patriarchal notions of femininity and 
motherhood, this loss of a foundational aspect of identity can completely obliterate any 
sense of self-worth or value. For Sarah, traditional femininity may help her access the 
womanhood that‟s been stripped from her as disabled woman. While Orin certainly 
wishes to hurt Sarah, his impetuous yet poignant line suggests exactly what‟s at stake in 
Sarah‟s marriage. 
 At the beginning of their marriage, therefore, Sarah assumes a traditionally 
feminine identity. More importantly, this feminine identity is indivisible from a 
conventionally American one. When James suggests that Sarah leaves the school and her 
job as a janitor and live with him “in the city somewhere,” the pair begins to discuss what 
she wants out of life (39). While they begin broadly conferring on her desire to be a 
teacher and to be with him, their conversation eventually devolves into the materials her 
future may hold. She wants a “House,” a “car,” to “plant a garden,” a “microwave oven,” 
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“a blender,” and a “food processor” (39). These things, most of which are kitchen 
appliances, are tied not only to being a traditional woman who cooks and nurtures, but 
also to the protoypical American wife and mother who rules her domestic dominion 
through cutting-edge consumer products. In many ways, then, Sarah‟s desire for “things” 
coincide with a desire for the American dream, for a husband, home, and children. On the 
one hand, her longing for this lifestyle is much like her desire to be an individual, an “I.” 
As both a person with a disability and a woman, Sarah has been doubly erased from the 
national narrative. She is quite literally without definition and meaning in a culture that 
requires independence and individualism. Her desire for things, for the American Dream, 
then, reveals her wish to lead a “normal” life, or, at the very least, a life that is not 
constantly under scrutiny or deemed deviant and wrong. Becoming the traditional, 
American housewife will allow her to fulfill a predetermined role, complete with a built-
in script.  
 So, she attempts this identity. The second act of the play commences with Sarah 
and James already married. They are set to play bridge with Mr. Franklin, the school‟s 
principal, and Mrs. Norman, Sarah‟s mother. In this scene, the group gathers at the 
newlywed‟s house, poised around a table, bantering as they play cards. Sarah bakes a 
quiche and wins the card game, outperforming everyone‟s and even her own 
expectations. As Orin declares in the following scene, “You drive a car…you shop by 
yourself in food stores, you have a checking account. You‟re a regular American 
housewife” (55). 
 Despite the success of the night and despite Orin‟s somewhat vituperative claim, 
Sarah seems neither happy nor comfortable in her newfound role. Beneath her bravado, 
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Sarah worries that the “quiche was runny on the bottom” and that she has failed in her 
roles as wife and hostess (54). Moreover, Sarah feels as though she were watched like “a 
laboratory specimen” (54). She assumes, probably correctly, that Franklin and her mother 
are examining her performance of normalcy as closely as a science experiement. Her 
panic about the solidity of her quiche and her anxiety about being watched derive from 
those issues that Asch and Fine suggest plague disabled women. As a Deaf woman, Sarah 
begins the scene worried that she will not stand up to hearing women‟s femininity or to 
that inexorable role of the American housewife. Before her guests arrive, Sarah silently 
signs “Watch—I‟ll ruin it and they won‟t be able to rave that the deafie cooked a quiche” 
(50). According to the disabling view of deafness, Sarah should be helpless, weak, 
dependent, and quite incapable of constructing something so complicated as a quiche. 
While the evening appears a success, she continues to worry about the solidity of the 
quiche. In many ways, Sarah appears to transfer her anxiety about her own “rolelessness” 
to this quiche, a food that is symbolically tied to feminine, American, and able-bodied 
identities. In other words, if her quiche fails then so does she. When James tells her how 
surprised he is at how well she played, Sarah sarcastically replies “She cooks a quiche, 
she bids her hand correctly,” as if these feats were impressive for anyone but a Deaf 
woman (53). While she takes on the American housewife role, she is not only anxious but 
also vexed by the intractable stereotyping she faces. 
 In this scene, Sarah reverts to a traditionally feminine identity. While she may not 
stay there long or comfortably, the inclusion of this kind of waffling suggests the 
immense problems that disabled women face. They are stripped of their femininity by 
force and divorced from sexuality and nurturance. Reverting to the trappings of 
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femininity to establish an identity may be the only way to have one.  While many women 
who are disabled later in life understandably cling to or assume a conventionally 
feminine identity, Sarah was born deaf. Her marriage, therefore, enacts the violent 
disturbance on her identity rather than the disability. In fact, her marriage threatens the 
core of her existence, her Deaf identity. While she performs the role of the wife and 
hostess, she remains anxious about what it might do to her own sense of Deaf identity. 
James jokingly reinforces her anxiety when he asks, “Are you afraid if you let everybody 
know you‟re enjoying life in the hearing world they‟ll revoke your angry deaf person‟s 
license?” (55). Her marriage does compromise her Deaf identity, a facet of her 
personality that James cannot fathom. Having grounded herself as a viciously 
independent, Deaf woman, her relationship with James threatens her understanding of 
herself.  
While the play leaves the future of their marriage open-ended, the havoc that the 
marriage wreaks on Sarah‟s self-identification seems to be the final impetus towards her 
interdependent/communal model of human interaction. Her very real person resists 
conventional, American, feminine, and able-bodied modes of identifying. She is neither 
independent nor does she want to be. Through their marriage, James discovers that he not 
only becomes a husband but a full time translator.  When Orin calls Sarah, James must 
listen to an intermediary translate Orin‟s signs into English, re-translate the English in 
ASL for Sarah, and speak her responses back into the phone. Tired and sore, James 
complains “My hands are killing me and my brain feels like a slab of…Look at that—I 
can‟t even spell „slab‟…I‟m going to put my hands into a s-a-u-n-a b-a-t-h” (63). The 
marriage takes its toll on James as well, who finds Sarah dependent rather than 
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interdependent. Her body and her identity defy conventional relationships. While James 
finds the constant translation understandably taxing, their translative relationship 
embodies Sarah‟s “individual yet as one model,” a direct blow to conventional, American 
identity. 
While I have been championing an interdependent model, I do not want to 
romanticize dependent or “parasitic” relationships that are lopsided.21 Interdependence, 
however, implies a mutual recognition of strengths and weaknesses, beyond the false 
dichotomy of independence and dependence. The “individual yet as one” model that 
Sarah forwards precludes questions of man/woman, hearing/Deaf, 
independence/dependence, and, most importantly, I/we. In her book Feminism and 
Disability, Hillyer investigates the relationship between disabled women and their female 
caretakers. In particular, Hillyer suggests that this pairing manages to “work out a model 
of reciprocity” that recognizes the strengths and limits of both parties (18). Moreover, 
Hillyer suggests that this is a model the male, able-bodied public can learn from. As she 
argues,  
Reciprocity involves the difficulty of recognizing each other‟s needs, relying on 
the other, asking and receiving help, delegating responsibility, giving and 
receiving empathy, and respecting boundaries. It also involves, as Eleanor 
Roosevelt pointed out, the ability to accept what we are unable to give and what 
others are unable to give. (Hillyer 18) 
What Hillyer outlines, then, is a model of human interaction based on personal and bodily 
integrity that understands and thereby respects mental, emotional, and physical limits. 
                                               
21
 For an in depth discussion of dependence and relationships, see the chapter “Love and 
Dependency” in Murphy‟s The Body Silent. 
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Impairments need not necessitate parasitic relationships. Under a “model of reciprocity,” 
both the dependent and the caregiver give and take concurrently. What constitutes 
dependence, therefore, is reconsidered and reinscripted. No longer deviant or wrong, 
dependence can come to be considered a human trait rather than a stigmatic one. 
Disabled women need not construct their identities on the invalid independence/ 
dependence dichotomy. Instead, they can question the reductive binary and offer a mode 
of living that is, in fact, beneficial to all people. Both Hillyer‟s “model of reciprocity” and 
Sarah‟s “individual yet as one” prototype reject binaries and craft a space for fluid and 
mutual interactions. 
While Sarah initially desires the American Dream, a feminine identity, and a 
conventional lifestyle for understandable reasons, she can never live it. Michael Warner 
writes,  
Nearly everyone wants to be normal. And who can blame them, if the alternative 
is being abnormal, or deviant, or not being one of the rest of us? Put in those 
terms, there doesn‟t seem to be a choice at all. Especially in American where 
[being] normal probably outranks all other social aspirations. (qtd. in McRuer 
490) 
Her wish is understandable. Even if the American Dream weren‟t a complete fiction, 
Sarah, a Deaf woman, is not a part of America, American identity, or the American 
Dream. She is “abnormal,” “deviant,” and “not..one of the rest of us,” whoever that may 
be (qtd. in McRuer 490). Rather than submit, however, Sarah once again writes herself 
into the national narrative. Instead of capitulating to false dichotomies, Sarah creates her 
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own model of humanity: “individual yet as one.” Her marriage does not force her into a 
submissive role, but highlights how subversive she truly is.  
 
Expanding and Refining “individual yet as one” 
 
 By the end of the play, Sarah and James have separated. Her “individual yet as 
one” speech, so poignant and important to this work, disrupts the tentative relationship 
they had begun to craft. After they have given the speech, James can only mutter “Well, 
you…That‟s all very…That‟s moving—it is, but…” (90). For once, James finds himself 
without words.  He quickly returns to himself, however, and tells Sarah that her 
“individual yet as one” model is too stubborn, that the hearing world will never “bend” to 
her (90). The pair fight, Sarah claiming James hasn‟t listened to a word she‟s signed and 
James insisting that Sarah‟s “real bitch” is that she wishes she could hear (91).  The scene 
builds and James unleashes his fury, signing and screaming,  
You want to be independent of me, you want to be a person in your own right, 
you want people not to pity you, but you want them to understand you in the very 
poetic way you describe in your speech…you learn to read my lips and you learn 
to use that little mouth of yours for something better than hearing girls in 
bed!...You can cook, but you can‟t speak. You can drive and shop and play bridge 
but you can‟t speak. You can even make a speech but you still can‟t do it alone. 
You always have to be dependent on someone, and you always will for the rest of 
your life until your learn to speak. Now come on! I want you to speak to me. Let 
me hear it. Speak! Speak! Speak! (92) 
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The latent sexism and paternalism that have bubbled beneath James‟ surface explode into 
unyielding vitriol in this his longest speech. To James, Sarah‟s independence is directly 
dependent on her ability to speak. To him, all of her actions in their marriage have been 
mere performance, stepping stones toward the truly independent act of speaking. 
Unwilling or perhaps unable to actually listen to Sarah‟s fervent signing, James 
completely misinterprets her speech. While Sarah challenges independence and its 
valorization in American, patriarchal, and ableist systems, James continues to exalt these 
modes of identifying. 
 James‟ disquieting oration, while invariably disturbing, offers Sarah yet another 
facet to her model of human interaction: non-domination/subordination. After his 
incessant goading, both in the scene and over the course of the entire play, Sarah finally 
speaks. Without signing, she screams “Speech! Speech! Is that it? No! You want me to be 
your child! You want me to be like you! How do you like my voice? Am I beautiful? Am 
I what you want me to be?” (92). While the note suggests that “[o]nly a few words are 
even barely understandable,” Sarah‟s urgent cry of “You want me to be like you!” 
resounds throughout the play.
22
 
On Sarah and James‟ first date, James becomes conflated with God, religion, and 
Christianity. He reveals that his mother made, “her confessor, complete with semi-
immaculate birth and healing powers” (19). He was her God. Later, Sarah brings this 
information up again, signing “So your mother told you you were God” (21). When 
James translates and confirms Sarah‟s deduction, she pointedly counters “And that‟s why 
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 This scene will be revisited in the third chapter, where I examine the moments when Sarah 
becomes in accessible to James and the audience. I argue that these moments are as important as 
her “individual yet as one” speech in that they highlight the important, cultural gap between the 
Deaf and Hearing worlds without closing off communication totally. 
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you want to make me over in your image” (21). Sarah conflates Christian scripture and 
audist policy. The need to make deaf people “hearing,” to speak and lip read, mimics the 
notion of God making humans in his image, as a reflection of himself. Sarah pointedly 
highlights the narcissism inherent in James‟ logic and in the audist system. Speaking only 
correlates with independence in a world defines it as such. 
While Sarah resists the domination of others, she repeatedly attempts to make 
others over in her image as well. In one scene, she explains to James how her mother 
hung a picture of the Virgin Mary in her bedroom the day Sarah was sent to the school 
for the deaf. Sarah, however, “drew a hearing aid in her ear” (45). Sarah‟s reinscription of 
Mary may revise the Christian narrative of disabilities and help craft a space within 
Christian theology for herself and others with anomalous bodies. This scene appears 
similar to when Sarah tells James that she wants “Children…Deaf children” (40). 
Understandably, Sarah wants to be surrounded by people like her, people who can 
understand her, and people who have never even encountered the correlation between 
deafness and negativity.  
 By the end of the play, however, Sarah realizes something. While she tells James 
that she wants deaf children before they get married, she completely reverses her original 
statement, claiming “I don‟t want deaf children” (96). James assumes her decision has 
something to do with him, but she pointedly states, “No. I just don‟t have the right to 
demand that anyone be created in my image” (96). Sarah‟s proclamation resounds. By 
this point in the play, she has been married to James and separated because of his violent 
insistence on making her speak. While the end of the play suggests that the two are now 
together again, this line is important. She reasserts herself and her declaration that she 
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will not be hearing, will not speak, will not read lips, and will be nothing but true to 
herself and her Deaf identity. Moreover, this line suggests that Sarah herself has grown in 
the intervening time. While her militant pride in her Deafness has been evident since the 
beginning of the play, she has resisted James as fiercely as he has pushed her. This 
assertion, then, suggests that she will not attempt to make him over in her image either. 
Embodying the Deaf and Hearing worlds, Sarah says “We would have to meet in another 
place; not in silence or in sound but somewhere else” (95-96). Beyond binaries, 
man/woman, deaf/hearing, I/we, silence/sound, independent/dependent, 
domination/subordination, the pair can finally be together. 
 When James and Sarah marry, he takes on a new role: her translator. James finds 
the job difficult, constantly translating to and from ASL, hands cramping from overuse, 
and the marriage fails. While this new role has the potential to move towards the model 
of community and interdependence that Sarah forwards, James cannot truly embody what 
Hillyer calls the “model of reciprocity.” Hillyer‟s model necessitates giving and taking 
according to individual strengths and weaknesses. Each person in the relationship must 
possess personal integrity, a recognition of one‟s own abilities, and the ability to 
cooperate with the others. As Sarah discovers over the course of the play, part of this 
“individual yet as one” mode or the “model of reciprocity” as Hillyer puts it, includes not 
dominating, subduing, or defining another‟s person‟s needs or abilities. One of the 
reasons James and Sarah‟s marriage fail is because he insists on defining Sarah‟s person. 
When he explodes, throwing caustic abuse at her, he claims that she doesn‟t “think being 
deaf is so goddamn wonderful” (91) and that she has “probably been reading lips 
perfectly for years” (92). Despite Sarah‟s own confirmation of her strengths and 
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weaknesses, James refuses to believe her. Instead, he constructs his own image of her. 
When Sarah erupts in her incoherent speech, she questions, “Am I what you want me to 
be?” (92).  James refuses to be a part of Sarah‟s “model of reciprocity,” to work in and 
through a marriage because he refuses to accept Sarah on her own, highly self-aware 
terms. What Sarah forwards, therefore, is the opposite of God‟s “making one over in his 
image.” Instead, as she suggests, we make our own images. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Sarah‟s refined model for human identification and interaction asks people to 
become more self-aware, to recognize personal strengths and weaknesses, and to accept 
others‟ similarly enlightened deductions of themselves. In many ways, Medoff‟s notes on 
the play reveal an analogous premise. In his “Not so Random Notes from the 
Playwright,” Medoff self-deprecatingly outlines the painful process of writing, 
producing, casting, and living the play for three full years of his life.  Most interestingly, 
Medoff‟s notes reveal his own insecurities about the play.  In one of the play‟s first 
incarnations, Medoff discovers that play has become “more about James” (iv).  He 
realizes that not only is he “not secure enough as a „deaf person‟” but that he is “like 
many male writers throughout history…accustomed to focusing on the male protagonist 
and surrounding him with functional females” (v).  Because he is hearing and a man, he 
has trouble accessing and portraying Sarah accurately, cannot “write the play [he] want[s] 
to write, the one in which James and Sarah share the stage equally” (v). Up until that 
point, James had dominated. No matter how hard Medoff tried, he could only see the 
world and the play from James‟ perspective. 
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 As the play traveled from Medoff‟s University‟s stage to Los Angeles, however, 
Sarah began to evolve through the very nature of theater: collaboration. Medoff claims, 
“Now when I rewrite I find myself (finally) automatically seeing the play from her point 
of view” (ix).  This change is reflected in the cast lists from early to late 1979. In the 
former, James and the actor who plays him are listed first in the playbill, while the later 
production lists Sarah first.  This freshness, this vivacity derives from what Medoff calls 
“the best collaborative tradition in the theatre” (ix). Throughout his notes, Medoff 
repeatedly refers to the interdependent and familial nature of writing and producing a 
play.  The play changes and evolves through new actors, new directors, new locations, 
and new audiences.  Medoff credits Sarah‟s evolution, and implicitly his own, to 
collaboration, to “reciprocity,” that essence of the stage and theater and the focus of my 
next chapter. 
 
“individual yet as one”: Genre, Audience, and Community 
 
 When Sarah delivers her pivotal monologue, her “individual yet as one” speech, 
she claims that she has always “been the creation of other people” (89). Both the doctors 
who misdiagnosed her as mentally handicapped and the audist system that perpetually 
designates her body and language as inadequate have attempted to define Sarah and mold 
her into self-referential likenesses. Orin tries to regain her allegiance to the Deaf cause as 
its Pure Deaf spokesperson, and James wants her to approximate Hearing by speaking 
and forswearing her Deaf identity. Her speech, therefore, is an assertion of individuality 
and self-determination. She claims that “people have always spoken for” her, “She says; 
she means; she wants. As if there were no I” (90).  Her monologue is, in a sense, a 
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performative speech act that creates and establishes her “I.” Her “[u]tterance is an 
enactment,” a rejection of those systems that deny her personhood and a reclamation of 
her humanity and identity (Solomon 11). In asserting her personhood, she becomes a 
person. 
 What I have been calling both a speech and a monologue, however, may not be 
classified as such. This momentous assertion of individual identity in the face of 
homogenizing oppression is actually spoken to the audience by James. Sarah signs and he 
translates. In fact, the stage directions suggest that the pair speak/sign in tandem, simply 
written “Sarah and James” (89). Staging Sarah‟s assertion of identity in this dual mode is 
not merely ironical or practical, but a performative representation of the “individual yet 
as one” model. Sarah signs to the audience and James speaks as her, embodying the 
communal model that both Sarah and the play forward. While in other scenes, which I 
will discuss, James speaks for rather than as Sarah, this scene and this speech 
demonstrate how powerful an interdependent model of communication and relationships 
can be. Moreover, it suggests how important the genre is to this message. 
 While I have argued that Deaf and female identities call for community and 
interdependence in ways seemingly antithetical to mainstream, American life, 
performance, in all its understandings, engenders, solicits, and creates the community and 
interdependence that Sarah expounds. The genre solidifies this message of community. 
For one, Sarah yearns for the fluidity that performance allows. When she asserts, “I don‟t 
know which role I‟m supposed to play” (76), the nature of the genre suggests that all of 
our identities are merely roles, capable of being taken up and placed aside as the situation 
arises. She need not always be “Deaf,” and can shift in an out of the performative 
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Deafness and womanhood as she sees fit. Moreover, Deafness itself is extremely 
performative, both in how members identify and in the interactivity of the language. Like 
a play, ASL relies on interaction, bodily and facial expressions to communicate. 
Theoretically the pair align, but practically there is no other genre that can express the 
captivating eloquence and perfomative nature of ASL; ASL simply cannot be written and 
must be performed. Most importantly, the nature of playwriting, the theater, and 
performance establishes a model of community that no other genre could express. Unlike 
novels, plays are a communally written process that necessitate an audience. When Sarah 
and James together affirm her “individual yet as one” model, they create the community 
she strives for, between each other, the actors, director, writer, off-stage help, and the 
audience itself. While the audience does not ever have unmediated or total access to 
Sarah‟s motivations, she and the play engender a “performance community” (Barr 16), 
offering the audience a glimpse into the Deaf world and into the life of a disabled 
woman. Where James fails to understand Sarah and her model for human interaction, the 
audience lives it, creating through the performance space an interdependent network of 
fluid and reciprocal relationships. The play, including all of its participants, does not 
merely model or pontificate, but actively generates a new mode of American 
identification based on Deaf culture and the theater. 
 
D/deafness: Performing History and Performing Identity 
 
 I spent the first chapter deeply devoted to d/Deaf identity, history, and particulars. 
Here, however, I would like to append the first chapter‟s assertions by emphasizing the 
integral role performance played and continues to play in Deaf culture and history. 
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Before the 60s and 70s, deafness and deaf people were dominated by a scientific or 
medical discourse that discussed deafness in terms of residual hearing and capacity for 
spoken language (Humphries 3-4). ASL was considered practical but ultimately inferior 
to abstract, spoken language. Deaf people themselves were considered unintelligent 
because they were unable to speak and denigrated with reductive and paradoxical epithets 
such as “aggressive” and “submissive” and “egocentric” and “unconfident” (Mask 39). 
While deaf people surely resisted these stereotypes, many accepted the widespread belief 
that ASL was simple and uncomplicated. Unable to effectively communicate with the 
hearing mainstream and recipients of a longstanding history of oppression and 
stereotyping, deaf people were considered as childish as their language. 
 In 1965, however, William Stokoe changed the history of the deaf with the 
publication of his Dictionary of American Sign Language. In this book, Stokoe 
challenged all previous scientific findings, validating ASL as a complex and linguistically 
viable language. With this substantiation, deaf people began to reimagine and redefine 
themselves. “As soon as there was a crack in the door—Stokoe‟s recognition that ASL 
was, indeed, a language,” Humphries asserts, “Deaf people began to talk about it, argue 
about it, and, interestingly, to do so in public” (6).  Many deaf people did not 
wholeheartedly accept linguistic validation, conditioned as they were by oralist and audist 
policies. Even though some deaf people opposed Stokoe‟s findings, Humphries suggests 
that this dissention generated a debate where none had existed before. Where the 
definition of deafness had once been controlled by the audist authority, the medical and 
scientific discourse, Stokoe‟s publication created multiple conversations on what “D”eaf 
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did or could mean, finally imbuing deaf people with the power to write their own 
definitions. 
While Stokoe‟s endorsement proved instrumental, evolving perceptions of 
deafness directly relied on deaf peoples‟ performances of the language. Humphries 
writes, “More than just talking about the language, Deaf people began to perform the 
language in public” (7). After centuries of opaque stereotypes and blatant prejudices, deaf 
people ventured into public life. Where before they were relegated to private households, 
schools, or industrial workrooms, linguistic validation brought them into the spotlight in 
new and exciting ways. As Humphries asserts, deaf people began to use and perform 
ASL in public, both amongst themselves and for hearing people. Soon, performances 
became the best way to explain deafness and ASL to the hearing mainstream because 
performances “had the power, through aesthetic and entertainment qualities, to compel 
and audience” and “bridge[d] the gap between folk explanation and scientific 
explanation” (7). In other words, performance allowed Deaf people to translate new 
scientific findings into captivating visual displays that effectively communicated the 
complexity of ASL and the intelligence of deaf people. These performances, therefore, 
became a powerful weapon against stereotyping and audist policies. 
Moreover, performance created, consolidated, and promulgated Deaf culture. In 
performing examples of ASL, deaf people can be said to have become Deaf. Through 
“ritualized explanations,” wherein deaf people coached other deaf people on how to 
explicate ASL and deafness to hearing people, Deaf culture generated itself (Humphries 
13). Performances not only allowed Deaf people to articulate who they were, but helped 
them discover who they were, both in relation to the mainstream and in relation to other 
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disabled people Performance created culture out of the audist void, directly contradicting 
the simplistic rendering of deafness innate to audist policy through representations of 
language and contesting stereotyping and negativity through pride and power. 
If Deaf culture concretized through performance, then Deaf identity is almost 
certainly performative. As I discussed in the first chapter, Deafness does not necessarily 
correlate with audiological deafness. A person could be hearing and Deaf. To return 
briefly, Deafness is characterized by many facets, including degree and age of hearing 
loss (pre- or post-lingually), language, education, and lineage. Children of Deaf adults 
(CODAs) who grow up using ASL could be considered more Deaf than a biologically 
deaf person who is mainstreamed, sent to public school, and only knows English. 
Deafness is contingent on a cultural language and identity rather than only a physical trait 
(Grushkin 122).  
Yet, detractors argue that disabled identities are not culture but physical ailments. 
Like Lane suggests, most “hearing people led to reflect on deafness generally begin by 
imagining themselves without hearing” (“Constructions” 166). To the mainstream, 
deafness is pathological, a tragic aberration that necessitates some kind of technological 
amelioration through hearing aids or cochlear implants, as audism mandates. 
Undoubtedly, this belief is a legacy of the medical paradigm that posits illnesses, 
diseases, and disability as deviations from a natural norm. What is natural or normal, 
however, is anyone‟s guess. Despite its ambiguity, “normal” and “natural” are considered 
trenchant, scientific categories. In his article “Compulsory Able-Bodiedness and 
Queer/Disabled Existence,” Robert McRuer argues that the “able-bodied identity is at this 
juncture even more naturalized than heterosexual identity” (490). That able-bodiedness is 
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the unstated norm is evident in that one never identifies as able-bodied. Its privilege is so 
“naturalized” that we don‟t recognize it until we ourselves age or become disabled. Nora 
Vincent writes,  
The human body is a machine…one that has evolved functional parts: lungs for 
breathing, legs for walking, eyes for seeing, ears for hearing, a tongue for 
speaking and most crucially for all the academics concerned, a brain for thinking. 
This is science, not culture. (qtd. in McRuer 490-91) 
In some sense, Vincent asserts a reasonable point. Disability is always located in the 
particular, the physical. A person who performs a disabled identity without a biological 
impetus would be labeled a charlatan and an opportunist. What Vincent misunderstands, 
and what McRuer argues, is that able-bodiedness is a temporal fiction like gender or 
sexuality, “always deferred and thus never really guaranteed” (492). Able-bodied 
identities only exist as a diametric opposite to disability. If able-bodiedness is only ever 
defined as “not disabled,” then any worthwhile definition is always illusory. In Deaf 
culture, deafness is not defined as a lack of hearing. It can only be defined as such if 
being hearing is the privileged state. Rather, deafness is the center or normal of Deaf 
culture, making hearing the abnormal, even disabled condition. This complete reversal 
illuminates the absolute relativity of such terms as “normal,” “natural” and “able-
bodied.” What Vincent takes as science, therefore, is more a matter of semantics.  
When McRuer demonstrates the porousness of such purportedly rigid terms as 
“ablebodied,” he highlights how important a move this is. Most people, and most 
Americans, even the most enlightened of us, are apt to think like Vincent, to think that 
disability is “„science, not culture‟” (qtd. in 491). This articulation not only suggests that 
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science should be impervious from scrutiny, that for some reason something that is 
“science” is hallowed, untouchable ground, but also that that which is biological cannot 
simultaneously be cultural. Wendell‟s assertion that “disability is socially constructed 
from a biological reality” encapsulates McRuer‟s argument and even Vincent‟s (263). 
Certainly disability is sown through physicality, but this physicality is always interpreted 
and understood through social and cultural means. Like gender or sexuality, therefore, 
disability, and, particularly, deafness is performative.  
Many disability theorists have already made the leap from Judith Butler‟s theories 
of sex, gender, and performance to disability. McRuer primarily focuses on the 
naturalization of able-bodiedness and therefore substitutes “terms having to do literally 
with embodiment for Butler‟s terms of gender and sexuality” (492). Other theorists such 
as Janet Price and Margaret Shildrick rephrases Butler‟s assertions on gender/sex to 
disability, writing “disability itself „is performative in the sense that it constitutes as an 
effect the very subject that it appears to express‟” (qtd. in Samuels 64). Ellen Samuels 
challenges this simplistic exchange of terms, asking what‟s lost or disturbed in the 
unchecked substitution. Moreover, Samuels contests Butler‟s emphasis on the role that 
language plays in materializing bodies and thereby Butler‟s relative disinterest in the 
physical, living, breathing, working, or perhaps not, body.  
Samuels‟ critique is important. In analyzing performativity, the body should and 
must be remembered. Deafness, while not contingent on physical deafness, is based in a 
particular, physical existence. Deafness would not exist without deafness. What Samuels 
fails to acknowledge, however, is the variation of disabled identities and communities. 
While some might easily question how a person in a wheelchair performs paraplegia, 
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something I would argue most undeniably do, Deafness is undoubtedly performative, in 
much the sense that gender or sexuality is. Based in language and heritage, one truly must 
perform Deafness to be or become Deaf.  
 That is not to say that there is one way to be Deaf. In fact, with the advent of 
technology like the cochlear implant, the definition of Deaf is constantly evolving. Now, 
many Deaf people have CIs and sign, or speak English and attend a school for the deaf. 
Perhaps because this technology threatens the physical underpinnings of Deafness, what 
it means to be Deaf has needed to broaden or face extinction. Modern Deaf people are the 
inheritors of the Biliginual-Bicultural movement (Bi-Bi) that teaches English and ASL, 
Hearing culture and Deaf culture (Newman). Capable of moving between the Deaf and 
Hearing worlds, performance is undeniably important to these Deaf individuals. With a 
foot in both worlds, these liminal Deaf people represent the impressive potential of 
performance for both the Deaf and Hearing worlds. What may be considered normative 
in Deaf culture, then, is this fluidity, this performance. While the hearing world and many 
Deaf people have attempted to categorize, quantify, and delineate d/Deafness through 
strict definitions and classifications, Deafness defies reduction, insisting on those 
performances that created and continue to create new ways of understanding and living 
Deafness.     
Disability and Theater 
 
If Deaf culture and Deafness are primarily performative, then theater appears to 
be the most revolutionary space for communicating radical ideas about disability. With 
its emphasis on performance, insistence on liminality and in-betweeness, and communal 
process, among other generic particulars, the theater offers a realm within which to test 
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the boundaries of the status quo. The stage, therefore, has been the refuge of the deviant 
and different. From feminists to queer activists, those outside of the American 
mainstream have used the theater, and its contingent rebellious characteristics, to 
challenge stagnant and reductive normativity, crafting a space for themselves in the 
American psyche. When early feminists used the theater to solidify a group identity in the 
face of misogynistic oppression, unintentionally marginalizing women of color and 
ignoring economic and sexual disparities, these forgotten women also took to the stage to 
contest dominating and overarching narratives of what it means to be a woman (Aston & 
Harris 7). Alisa Solomon asserts that theater is “the art most potentially offensive to the 
social order” (9). She argues “Not only was the theater hospitable to those bound up in 
impersonation; it also acknowledged and made space for gender ambiguities that 
mainstream society labored vigorously to suppress” (13). On the stage, identities become 
unfixed, gender is shown to be undeniably performative, sexuality shifts fluidly, and, as I 
will argue, ability is defiantly deconstructed.  
In a culture that denies the indivisible correlation between mind and body, the 
stage insists on the overwhelming presence of the body “in all its sweating, spitting 
specificity” (Solomon 9). Western culture has tended “to devalue and thus efface the 
body” through such pervasive ideologies as Christianity and Cartesian dualism 
(Signifying 9). These systems prefer to elevate the mind at the expense of the body. Yet, 
the body is “that which most fundamentally endows us with existence—that which most 
obviously individuates us” (Signifying 10). Modern trends in the Western world, 
however, seek “to perfect, control, or even transcend the body” (Signifying 10). Couser 
argues that anti-aging surgeries have skyrocketed in recent years and that “plastic surgery 
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today tends to deny our common destiny,” that is aging and, inevitably, death (Signifying 
10). Disability, however, forces both the individual with the disability and the people who 
interact with her to viscerally face their “destiny.” While bodies are undeniably important 
to gender and sexuality, people with disabilities can never escape their embodiment. 
Their wheelchairs or their speech cannot be hidden, thus they are inseparable from their 
bodies, in their own minds and in others‟. While much of Western culture divorces the 
mind from the body, the disabled can never escape the entangled relationship with 
corporeality. 
In some insistences, therefore, the stage can exploit disabilities, particularly 
visible ones. Staged representations of physical disability problematically arrange the 
person with the disability as a spectacle while the viewer is invested with the power of 
the gaze and potentially positioned as a voyeur. As Stacy Wolf argues,  
Whether stared at with curiosity, gazed upon with titillation, perused with 
prurience, or studied with admiration, visibly disabled bodies seldom occupy a 
drama‟s center stage. Rather they function to allow nondisabled characters to 
demonstrate their generosity and nondisabled spectators to experience their 
normalcy. (302) 
While Wolf‟s assertion may easily translate to any work of art, the visual rather than 
written representation of a disabled person elides humanity and heightens that “sweating, 
spitting specificity” of the body (Solomon 9). Undoubtedly, some dramas exploit their 
disabled characters, but this seems to be a trend in Western art rather than a coincidence 
of theater. The stage always insists on the human body, but it can and often does, by its 
very nature, “disrupt conventional patterns of seeing, of knowing, and, especially, of 
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seeing and knowing bodies” (Solomon 9). For the disabled who can never escape their 
bodies and for the able-bodied public that polices and enforces this embodiment, the 
stage can offer a revolutionary arena to visualize and “disrupt conventional patterns…of 
seeing and knowing [disabled] bodies” (Solomon 9). Where Western culture rejects and 
denies the body, the stage insists on it, a relationship that can be both problematic and 
revolutionary for analyzing and deconstructing disability.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
Children of a Lesser God is one such revolutionary play. Practically, plays are 
almost the only arena for discussing deafness. ASL is, of course, a visual language that 
can never be accurately written. While efforts have been made to transcribe ASL into 
English, almost every transcription method only flattens its dynamic visual displays. 
Plays and films are perhaps the only mediums capable of capturing the alluring eloquence 
of ASL.
23
 The language is not merely visual, however, but requires performativity and 
interaction. Even simple, quotidian conversations utilize facial expression, body 
movement, and an audience. For these reasons, ASL and Deaf culture easily translate to 
the stage. Michael Davidson suggests that ASL storytelling is “paradoxical[ly]” close to 
“ancient oral traditions since both stress face-to-face contact between poet and audience” 
(109). Moreover, “Both rely on audience participation in knitting community together, 
and both stress qualities of variation, facial expression, and face-to-face exposure” 
(Davidson 109). ASL poetry, storytelling, and even conversations are always 
performance. Davidson claims, “In ASL poetry, meaning is established through a body 
                                               
23
 While I have noted that there is no one, unifying transcription method for translating ASL into 
writing, numerous transcription systems “developed out of dance notation” (Senghas & 
Monaghan 88). That is, ASL is analogous with dance in some sense, another kind of 
performance. I do not have the time to follow this intriguing and most likely fruitful thread, but 
an investigation of this sort would continue to illuminate the various elements of performance that 
pervade ASL and, in turn, Deaf lives. 
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that is also a text” (109). I would like to amend Davidson‟s assertion and suggest that the 
body, in ASL, is not merely “a text” but a stage and the individual is not only a poet but 
an actor. The term “text” continues to privilege the written word when writing and 
textuality are relatively unimportant in Deaf culture. The body as stage, however, 
incorporates the performative aspects of both ASL and Deaf identity, more accurately 
reflecting the complexities of Deafness.  
The stage, however, is not merely practical for Deaf people. Rather, it is an ideal 
space for constructing, articulating, and deconstructing Deaf identity. For one, 
performance, and drama in particular, is the best venue for demonstrating the 
performative nature of all identities. On stage, actors contest the Enlightenment belief in 
an essential personhood or self. Between scenes, between roles, and between identities, 
performances assert the fluidity and multiplicity of identity. As Solomon argues, 
“Theater…challenge[s] ideas of fixed identities” by “unmooring” such “seemingly 
impermeable” categories of gender, sexuality, and ability “from the idea that they derive 
absolutely and inevitably from an original objective source” (14). Where identities seem 
to be natural, performance illuminates the intersections between reality and 
representation, highlighting the instability of identity and reveling in the confusion. The 
very notion of acting reveals that identities can be performed, that people can be other 
than they appear, and that “real” and “natural” are only fictions. While much of America 
maintains disability as a physical or biological imperative, disabled identities and 
Deafness are not only culturally informed but also performative. Being Deaf is, primarily, 
a matter of choice—of language, relationships, and self-identification. While Solomon‟s 
argument suggests the powerful impact of performance on gender and sexuality, theater 
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can be equally as potent for demonstrating the performative nature of disabled and Deaf 
identities. As the stage heightens the relationship between the body and the individual, it 
can also begin to deconstruct the naturalized discourses on ability, able-bodiedness, and 
disability. 
Many of these naturalized discourses derive from the breadth of narratives that 
problematically rely on disability and deviance to drive their plots. As Lennard J. Davis 
argues, disability and difference constitute the very basis of narrative forms. In 
“Constructing Normalcy: The Bell Curve, the Novel, and the Invention of the Disabled 
Body in the Nineteenth Century,” Davis traces the history of the normal body, correlating 
it with the rise of statistics and the novel form. Davis writes, “the very structures on 
which the novel rests tend to be normative, ideologically emphasizing the universal 
quality of the central character whose normativity encourages us to identify with him or 
her” (21). Davis asserts that the novel, through its insistence on normalcy and 
“middleness,” creates the category of the Other, the different, ultimately, the disabled.  
Implicitly, Davis argues that the novel form, by its very nature, is always dangerous to 
difference. 
While Davis‟ history of the novel is compelling, David T. Mitchell offers another 
way to conceptualize the relationship between disability and stories.  Mitchell uses the 
term “narrative prosthesis” to characterize “the notion that all narratives operate out of a 
desire to compensate for a limitation or to reign in excessiveness” (20). As he argues, all 
stories necessitate aberrancy, whether physical or not, in order to propel the narrative arc 
toward a resolution. Mitchell claims “[t]he anonymity of normalcy is no story at all” (21). 
Rather, difference serves as the foundation for all tales (21). 
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As both Davis and Mitchell argue, narratives and particularly novels rely on 
aberrancy. While most plays are undoubtedly narratives, neither Davis nor Mitchell 
explicitly discusses theater in terms of their respective analyses. I would like to argue that 
the theater, while potentially problematic in terms of visibility and voyeurism, represents 
a revolutionary form for staging, analyzing, and communicating radical ideas about 
aberrancy, deviance, and disability.  Plays are a fluid space wherein bodies are constantly 
in flux, between scenes, roles, and identities as they are not and cannot be in any other 
genre. As I have already established, the stage highlights the fluidity of identity and the 
performative nature of all human categories, making it a progressive space for 
deconstructing gender, sexuality, and disability. Here, I would also like to suggest that 
part of the theater‟s revolutionary potential derives from its insistence on community.  
Unlike novels, stories, or poems, the stage requires, solicits, and elicits 
community. In the first two chapters, I argued that independence is a pivotal aspect of 
patriarchal, audist/ableist, and American identities. Davis and Mitchell suggest that 
novels and narratives reinforce the status quo and, in particular, this conventional 
emphasis on independence. Traditional novels rely on the trajectory of a single 
protagonist, perhaps the ultimate fruition of independence. On the stage, however, 
“[e]ven the most carefully composed tableau does not focus the spectatorial gaze” 
(Savran 162). Rather, “the spectator‟s necessarily errant eye” can choose to focus on any 
aspect of the performance, from the actor speaking to the set and even to the audience 
around them (Savran 163).  Even plays that emphasize independence, individualism, and 
the narrative arc of a single protagonist cannot manipulate the audience‟s gaze, thereby 
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inviting them to interrogate and create meaning, to become a part of the theatrical 
process. 
Richard L. Barr simply asserts that “theater itself…is always about community 
because performance always involves communal dynamics” (3). When  
theater is conceived as a whole in which stage and auditorium form equally 
representative and complementary parts, then interplay between the occupants of 
these two realms is as quintessentially theatrical as playing itself and in fact 
becomes the very thing that playing aims to promote. (Barr 9) 
Theater, therefore, is not merely the actors or the script, but the “interplay” between the 
“stage and auditorium,” between what precedes and occurs as spectacle and what 
becomes the audience  (Barr 9).  While many privilege the stage, for obvious reasons, 
Barr asserts that the “stage and auditorium form equally representative and 
complementary parts,” essentially “individual yet as one” (9). The audience, or what 
develops into the audience, is as crucial to the production as the playwright or actor. 
Theater is community, making the stage an ideal space for discussing disability and Deaf 
culture. Both contest reigning narratives of national identity, particularly that tenet of 
independence. Unlike other narrative forms that problematically utilize disability and 
difference as narrative devices, the theater actually venerates aspects of disability and 
Deaf cultures, especially community. In this way, theater and Deaf culture can align to 
form a potent critique of able-bodiedness, patriarchy, and national identity. 
 One of the most important ways plays undermine independence is in their genesis. 
The writing process is always communal. While novels and narratives are typically 
written by a single person, although not always, plays are invariably created through 
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collaboration. Barr suggests “the author, director, and designer all creatively contribute to 
any production” (10). Moreover, “„[actors] are dependent on the playwright, and are in 
voluntary collaboration with him; [the designer] is dependent on the author and the 
actors, and he should voluntarily ally himself with both‟” (qtd. in Barr 10). Plays, 
therefore, necessitate an equalizing collaboration. While a playwright may craft the 
script, a production cannot succeed without design, directing, and acting, each of which 
informs the audience‟s understandings of the play itself. Without hierarchy, this 
collaboration mimics Sarah‟s “individual yet as one” exemplum and Hillyer‟s “model of 
reciprocity.” The nature of theater, its collectivity, almost exactly replicates those 
interdependent relations important to disability studies and pivotal in Children of a Lesser 
God.  
As I argued at the end of the second chapter, the collaborative writing process 
actually augmented Sarah‟s character. At the beginning, Medoff struggled with finding 
an authentic voice for Sarah. The Sarah contemporary audiences discover, however, 
evolved through that innate essence of the theater: community. Medoff writes,  
As much as I relish one-on-one athletic competition, I have nevertheless relished 
equally the interdependence, the sharing, the collaboration, the familial nature of 
team sports. Work in the theatre on a play by a group of people has about it those 
qualities. (“Not So”) 
Through months of workshopping and input from actors, directors, and producers alike 
Sarah becomes a full character, the protagonist in her own right. Much of Medoff‟s  “Not 
so Random Notes from the Playwright” is spent discussing the collaborative genesis of 
the play, crediting deaf actress Phyllis Frelich for germinating the idea for the play, the 
 97 
 
director, Gordon Davidson, for critiquing him, and a massive laundry list of co-
conspirators in the creative process. Despite setbacks and false starts, the play finally 
comes together “in the best collaborative tradition of the theatre” (“Not So”). While the 
play‟s script and that initial run on Broadway exemplify the collaborative genesis of a 
play, Children of a Lesser God continues to evolve through new productions, new 
producers, new actors, and new audiences. The play, as an amorphous and ever-changing 
entity, persistently transforms through each and every new community it engenders.  
Unlike other narratives, plays insist on interdependence and community. Not only 
is the stage the best form for communicating in ASL, but it is also the most radical space 
for communicating theoretical ideas about Deafness and Deaf culture. Interdependence, 
community, and collaboration are paramount to both Deaf culture and the theater and the 
importance of each is heightened through their intersection in Children of a Lesser God.  
Sarah explicitly states these intertwining concepts in her “individual yet as one” speech, 
illuminating the predominant message of the play. Moreover, this insistence on 
community undermines American notions of individualism, as I have discussed at length 
in the previous chapters. Like Deaf culture, the stage resists monolithic definitions of 
identity, whether it be gendered, national, or anywhere in between. This resistance is, as 
many theorists have argued, particular to the theater and as I have argued particular to 
Deaf culture. The relationship between Deafness and the stage, therefore, is of productive 
symbiosis, each informing the other, a relationship that Medoff and his crew exploits. 
 
ASL on Stage: Community Formation 
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One of the most complicated and potentially interesting aspects of any staging of 
Deafness is how to incorporate and use ASL. In an interview, Deaf actor and director 
Adrian Blue claims “It‟s easy to make sign understandable for a hearing audience” 
(“ASL” 234).  In A Nice Place to Live, his play on a nineteenth-century community on 
Martha‟s Vineyard with an extraordinarily high rate of deafness, Blue uses two hearing 
women gossiping about the action of the play to “translate” the deaf character‟s signing 
(“ASL” 234-35).  While Blue‟s translation is highly creative and incorporated into the 
plot, many other plays and performances use simpler means to communicate ASL to 
hearing audience members, including projecting translations above the stage and, as 
Children of a Lesser God does, using other characters to translate.  
While the translative method in Children of a Lesser God may seem 
uncomplicated, its variations are paramount to understanding the play. Throughout the 
entire production, James and sometimes Orin translate Sarah‟s signs out loud, perhaps for 
themselves but predominantly for the hearing audience. While the audience can visually 
view Sarah‟s signs, the majority of the audience needs James to interpret for them.  Every 
time we “hear” Sarah, then, we hear James. These translations vary from second person 
iterations to a first person dual articulation. In some instances, however, Sarah‟s signing 
isn‟t and can‟t be translated. The audience‟s relationship with Sarah, therefore, vacillates. 
Sometimes we understand her through James‟ mediating voice, sometimes we hear and 
see a more authentic voice, and sometimes we can only guess at what she means. 
Through this oscillation, Medoff engenders “heterogeneous integration,” wherein the 
audience is “invit[ed]…to shed comforting blinders and (re)view their social worlds” and 
to unite through “similarity in difference” (Barr 67). We are pushed to relate to Sarah, but 
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are incapable of fully understanding her and thus incapable of completely fulfilling the 
traditional audience-protagonist identification. Instead, Medoff creates a community of 
analytical participants, capable of critical analysis and capable of becoming one, not in 
spite of, but through difference. 
Over the course of the play, James‟ translations vary from second person 
iterations to a first person dual articulation. Frequently, however, James translates to his 
own perspective. When they first meet, Sarah says to him “You give up easier than most” 
(6).  When James translates this line, however, he changes the subject: “I give up easier 
than most?” (6). In another, particularly ironic scene, James informs Sarah that he would 
like to be the translator for the speech she‟ll be delivering for Deaf rights. Sarah signs, “I 
can‟t say what I feel about being deaf through a hearing person,” which James speaks to 
the audience as “You can‟t say what you feel about being deaf through…through a 
hearing person” (88-89).  When translating, James shifts personal pronouns, moving from 
Sarah‟s first person point of view to second person. The majority of Sarah‟s lines are 
relayed in this fashion and may, as Spirko suggests, refashion James as the protagonist 
(22), a point I will return to below. 
These lines are, of course, ironic given the fact that not only has James been 
speaking “for” Sarah over the course of the play but because her lines are also literally 
written by a hearing man. This exchange, therefore, meditates on translations, power, and 
authenticity. As I have argued, Sarah is positioned in a doubly oppressed role as a Deaf 
woman. While James appears to translate faithfully, her powerlessness is heightened by 
this translative relationship. In many ways, James‟ role as translator further cements his 
culturally superior status, but, here, I would like to suggest that James‟ translation is just 
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one of many in the play and thus indicative of a larger theme. James always translates for 
Sarah, but the playwright always writes these lines for both of them. Moreover, as the 
character list mentions, Sarah‟s lines are written in grammatically correct English as 
opposed to written ASL. The actress who portrays Sarah, then, must engage in her own 
round of translations, transforming the grammatically correct English into ASL. What the 
audience finally receives, then, is multiply translated, from the script to the stage and 
from the stage to their ears. 
 While James‟ persistent translations certainly raise the question of who has the 
authority, power, and privilege to translate, the innumerable translations of the genre 
heighten one of the play‟s chief themes: inaccessibility. So much of disability studies, 
including this essay, is focused on making disability accessible to the able-bodied, and so 
many organizations and institutions are devoted to making public spaces accessible to the 
disabled. Accessibility is championed as the religion of the disability rights movement 
and the passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act is its messiah, making 
accessibility a right rather than an option. I obviously do not mean to suggest that the 
ADA is anything but momentous and imperative. The impact and importance of such 
laws cannot be minimized. I would, however, like to reexamine the word accessibility 
and its positive connotations. While it is important to accept difference, deviance, and 
disability, understanding should not be a prerequisite. In Children of a Lesser God, Sarah 
is deliberately constructed as somewhere between accessible and inaccessible, making it 
more difficult to identify with her. Both her moments of accessibility and inaccessibility 
suggest that community formation must take place through difference, even and 
especially those differences that we may not understand.  
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While James‟ voice anchors the play, Sarah steers and propels Children of a 
Lesser God. In some moments, however, James speaks as rather than for Sarah. In the 
most important speech of the play, her “I” speech, Sarah signs and James speaks as her to 
the audience. Sarah explains the expansiveness of ASL and in doing so offers an 
alternative paradigm for considering personhood, “the sign „to connect,‟ a simple sign—
but it means so much more when it is moved between us like this. Now it means to be 
joined in a shared relationship, to be individual yet as one” (89).  Even in her major 
speech of independence she explains that she wants to be connected to the world, “to be 
individual yet as one” (89). The way this speech is performed, therefore, is paramount to 
its call-to-action. Sarah‟s “I” speech, her great monologue of independence, is spoken by 
James.
24
 Even while she is asserting her independence, someone else speaks for her. 
While in other moments James translates to the second person, here, he uses first person. 
In this way, Medoff appears to obviate questions of authenticity or ownership. I would 
like to designate this speech not a monologue, then, but a “dualogue,” two people 
speaking in tandem, “individual yet as one.” Through this “dualogue,” speaking and 
signing as one, Sarah and James offer and embody the “individual yet as one” exemplum 
and that “model of reciprocity” that Wendell forwards (273).  
The “individual yet as one” model, however, is not achieved through a mere 
transmogrification into one signing/speaking being, but primarily realized through unity 
through difference. In this speech, we encounter as unmediated a glimpse into Sarah‟s 
mind as we can. Here, James comes the closest to understanding Sarah, to accessing and 
                                               
24
 Even the construction of this sentence belies the difficulties of translations. The only way to 
keep Sarah in the subject position is to write the sentence in passive voice. Despite the fact that 
James translates, a subordinate role, those writing rules want him to be the primary actor. Even 
the act of translation forces Sarah into an inferior position. 
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coming “inside” her “silence” (90). In turn, it is the closest we, the audience, come as 
well.  However, many moments are inaccessible to James and to the audience and it is 
through these moments that the “individual yet as one” model is actualized. Immediately 
after what I have deliberately been championing as this pivotal moment of the play, the 
“individual yet as one” speech, Sarah and James‟ relationship completely devolves. 
While I examined this scene closely in the second chapter, I would like to return to it here 
again in terms of performance. After her speech, James can only mutter a couple of half-
iterated, hackneyed phrases about the speech being “moving” (90). When Sarah suggests 
that he‟s “pitying” her, however, his platitudes transform into an eruption of vituperations 
(90). He rejects her “individual yet as one” model, claiming  
You want to be independent of me, you want to be a person in your own right, 
you want people not to pity you…, then you learn to read my lips and you learn to 
use that little mouth of yours for something  besides eating and showing me that 
you‟re better than hearing girls in bed! (92) 
When Sarah attempts to sign, he physically restrains her, violently shutting down the only 
means available for her to express herself. He finally, desperately yells, “Now come on! I 
want you to speak to me. Let me hear it. Speak! Speak! Speak!” (92). Not only does 
James clearly misunderstand her “individual yet as one” model, but he aggressively 
assaults her, both verbally and physically. 
 The scene, however, truly culminates when Sarah speaks for the first time in the 
play and perhaps the first time in her life. She “erupts like a volcano in speech,” crying 
“Speech! Speech! Is that it? No! You want me to be your child! You want me to be like 
you. How do you like my voice? Am I beautiful? Am I what you want me to be? What 
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about me? What I want? What I want!” (92). As the stage directions read, however, “She 
can’t be sure how this sounds except by his reaction to it. It is clearly sentences, the sense 
of it intelligible, but it is not a positive demonstration of speech—only of passion” (92). 
Unless the audience has a script, therefore, it is impossible to know exactly what Sarah 
says. Instead, we only hear “passion” (92). This powerful moment makes the audience 
nearly as vulnerable as it does Sarah. Dependent on spoken language and translations 
ourselves, the audience is ungrounded and shaken by our inability to understand. If 
briefly, we live like Sarah. This moment not only draws the audience closer to Sarah in 
some sense, but distances us from her. She brutally reminds the audience that she can‟t 
speak, that she is different, and does necessitate translation. The audience must reckon 
with the discomfiting notion that the Deaf and Hearing worlds are different and every 
interaction we have had with Sarah has been mediated.  
 In another, very different yet strangely similar scene, Sarah is also inaccessible to 
James and in turn to the audience. While the scene where she speaks is a violent reminder 
of the differences between the Deaf and Hearing and the dangerous, catastrophic 
consequences of audism and paternalism, inaccessibility is not necessarily an awful thing. 
In the previous scene, it serves as a reminder of the necessity of cultural dialogue, but it 
can also highlight the importance of a culture and its language as well. At the beginning 
of their relationship, Sarah and James engage in a frank conversation about D/deafness. 
Sarah tells James, “I live in a place you can‟t enter. It‟s out of reach…Deafness isn‟t the 
opposite of hearing, as you think. It‟s a silence full of sound” (32). When James asks 
“Really?”, Sarah responds in an ASL approximation of the line “The sound of spring 
breaking up through the death of winter” (32). The stage notes read, “He doesn’t 
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understand the juxtaposition of: “winter”…”earth”…”broken”…”growth” which is how 
she begins the line; yet, he is moved by it” (32). Sarah‟s complicated, eloquent, and 
undeniably poetic description of Deafness is inaccessible to James, yet he still manages to 
be “moved by it” (32). While he may not understand the words she‟s using, he can 
understand that he can‟t understand. When he asks her “What does that mean?,” Sarah 
responds with “My secret. No hearing person has ever gotten in here to find out…No 
person, period” (32). While we understand pieces of Sarah, especially in her “individual 
yet as one” speech, here, she reminds us that we can never fully understand another 
human being, especially one so far from our own centers. Instead, we are united through 
our differences, as Barr suggests.  
While many narratives, even plays, rely on audience/reader-protagonist 
identification, Children of a Lesser God resists such a simple relationship. In part, this 
pseudo-identification indicates the gap between the Deaf and Hearing worlds. While the 
play offers a glimpse into the Deaf world, it is only ever a translation of a translation and 
thus unable to fully represent Sarah. This aspect of the play is not a failure, however, but 
a purposeful recognition of difference. Moreover, in keeping Sarah inaccessible, Medoff, 
the production team, and the actors begin to initiate the “individual yet as one” model, 
further refining it. To be “individual yet as one” takes integrity, but it does not necessitate 
complete understanding. A network of interdependence cannot be contingent on complete 
knowledge not only because knowing is never comprehensive but because true, if 
provisional, unity can only be achieved through difference. In the space of the theater, 
through staging, and through the audience, unity through difference and the “individual 
yet as one” model work towards fruition. 
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The Audience: Community Formation Beyond the Stage 
 
 
 I have argued that James and Sarah‟s “dualogue” literally enacts the “individual 
yet as one” model. When they speak and sign together, both utilizing first person, they 
embody those physical and theoretical concepts of the speech. Of course, this brief 
harmony fails. James cannot accept Sarah‟s Deafness and all that it entails, severing their 
short-lived bond. Sarah may not manage to engender total unison with James, but she 
does form a community. She becomes, if only in the physical space of the theater, one 
with the audience. 
 The audience is always a pivotal aspect of the theatrical experience, but 
tantamount to Children of a Lesser God and its communal goal. Blau writes 
The audience…is not so much a mere congregation of people…It does not exist 
before the play but is initiated or precipitated by it; it is not an entity to begin 
with but a consciousness constructed. The audience is what happens when, 
performing the signs and passwords of a play, something postulates itself and 
unfolds in response. (qtd. in Barr 16)  
As Blau suggests, the audience becomes itself during a production, forming a critical part 
of that collaborative process of theater. In terms of Children of a Lesser God, the 
audience is “initiated” into the play and thereby into the Deaf world, a place that most 
will know nothing about.  They are not merely introduced to these worlds, but “at once 
creative in and created by performance relations” (Barr 16).  
 While all plays require and create an audience, the audience of any production of 
Children of a Lesser God is critical to Sarah‟s fruition as a disabled woman and to the 
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“individual yet as one” model she forwards. Over the course of the play, Sarah evolves 
from a militantly independent and negative person to a model of interdependence. She 
transforms not through James or Orin, or any other character, but through the audience 
itself. She describes her earnest desire “to be joined to other people” (90). She achieves a 
brief unity through the dual articulation of the line with James, but she most powerfully 
unites with the audience. In expressing herself, she does become “joined to other people” 
through the experience of the theater. In turn, this unity affords her the clarity to evolve 
and to discover her model for human interaction. While she may fail to truly connect with 
James, she creates her connection and community with the audience, allowing them to 
“come inside” her” silence” and become the network of relationships she desires and the 
genre solicits (90). 
 This network of relations, however, is not the homogenous, unthinking mass of 
“„little Oedipuses,‟” or Sarahs, as Bertold Brecht foretells (qtd. in Barr 71). In the height 
of his dramatic theory, Brecht, as Barr glosses, 
propose[s] alienation as the ideal relation between audience and actor…offering 
emotional distance as a necessary corrective to the kind of empathetic 
identification…that inhibits the radical communal potential of contemporary 
bourgeous theater. (Barr 71) 
To Brecht, “empathetic identification” keeps audience members from fully analyzing the 
theatrical experience. Instead, Brecht argues that the audience merely “lose[s] 
themselves” in the character and in the experience, thereby decimating any chance for 
critical analysis (Barr 71). 
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 While this may pose a problem in traditional theater, especially those productions 
that allow unmediated access to their protagonist, Sarah is never completely available to 
the audience and thus never able to be identified with completely. Spirko suggests that 
“[i]t is an open question whether the audience is able to meet [Sarah] on that ground…on 
her own terms [and] in her own language” (22). To Spirko, James‟ mediating voice 
dominates the play. He writes, “Despite Medoff‟s assertion that Sarah is the true 
protagonist of the play, James remains the filtering consciousness through which the play 
is told” (22). While Spirko defers to differing staging, he concludes that “a hearing 
audience will be more likely to find in a hearing character their identification point with 
the play” (22).   
I‟m honestly unsure of where to begin to untangle this knot of gross assumptions 
and misreadings. First, I think I‟d like to begin with Spirko‟s misrepresentation of Sarah. 
In some sense, Spirko asserts a truth about the play. While we can “relate” or empathize 
with Sarah, we cannot truly know her. Everything is mediated. What Spirko 
misrepresents, however, are those moments the audience gains some kind of access to 
Sarah, through “points of contact” (Barr 69)—those flashes of clarity and accessibility, 
such as the “individual yet as one speech”—that allow us to “come inside” her “silence” 
(90). Secondly, I‟d like to question Spirko‟s privileging of identification as the preferable 
relationship between audience and protagonist. Brecht‟s warning, that the theater, 
through unmitigated identification, may turn its audience into passive recipients seems 
apropos here. Only an audience conditioned to identify with a protagonist would “be 
more likely to find in a hearing character their identification point with the play” (Spirko 
22). Thirdly, therefore, I would like to suggest that audience can, in fact, unite with Sarah 
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and does. These “points of contact” that allow us to empathize are few, forcing the 
audience, actors, director, playwright, and every member of the performance to engage in 
a “perspectival partnership that must respect, and indeed depends on, similarity in 
difference” (Barr 67). Part of this goal includes being able “to relate characters without 
denying their individuality” (Barr 69). While Brecht‟s theatrical method may create 
“critical awareness” through “alienation…by preventing viewers from losing themselves 
in the play,” Children of a Lesser God in its oscillation between accessibility and 
inaccessibility “enable[s] potential critics to first find themselves through the play” (Barr 
71). As Sarah discovers herself over the course of the play, the audience similarly creates 
itself, refining its own understandings of Deafness, humans, and the world. The audience, 
therefore, is an actor in the production, a critical apparatus, they themselves united 
through difference in the space of the theater and through the course of the play. 
 
Conclusion 
  
 After a difficult conversation with James, Orin, and Klein, the lawyer, in which 
every other character attempts to define and control her, Sarah cries “I don‟t know which 
role I‟m supposed to play” (76). While James and Orin certainly care for Sarah, even love 
her, they refuse to accept her as is and instead try to make her over in their own images. 
As a Deaf woman, however, Sarah defies reductive definitions of what both of these 
identifiers mean or could mean. She can flit between identities, between roles, like an 
actor in a play.  
 The theater, unlike many other genres, has long acted as a site of rebellion and 
revolution. Through its insistence on the body in a culture that denies bodily specificity 
 109 
 
yet polices them all the more powerfully to the actor‟s ability to dissolve the lines 
between reality and play by the very operation of acting, plays and performances can 
stage radical coups against the trenchant status quo. In terms of Children of a Lesser God, 
Sarah contests multiple norms, including D/deaf stereotypes, both amongst the hearing 
and militant Deafies alike, gender conventions, and American identity.  
 Americans may have never been as enthralled with the stage as their trans-
Atlantic counterparts, but this play argues that the stage can be a haven for all those 
forcibly written out of or simply forgotten in the national narrative. Where novels and 
traditional narrative forms rely on difference and deviance to propel their plots, the stage 
can offer a revolutionary space for disability, a communal, interdependent network that 
can actively work to deconstruct stigma and reaffirm lived experiences. While the 
audience does not gain full access to Sarah, and, as I have argued, shouldn‟t, she, simply 
as the focus of the play, refines American identity, crafting a place for herself. Perhaps 
more importantly, through that theatrical process, she crafts a place in the audience as 
well for deviance, difference, and disability. Community is “the very thing that playing 
aims to promote” (Barr 9) and, thus, in this simple correlation works to fracture the 
trenchant glorification of individuality and singularity so important to American identity, 
making room for Deafness and all those designated as “children of a lesser God.” 
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Conclusion 
On Sunday March 6
th, 1988, Gallaudet University‟s Board of Trustees announced 
the appointment of Dr. Elisabeth Zinser, a hearing woman with no knowledge of Deaf 
culture or ASL, to the presidency of the only liberal arts institution for the deaf in the 
world. That night students marched to the hotel housing the board, the White House, and 
the Capitol building to express their indignation and protest Zinser‟s installation. By the 
next morning, Gallaudet students had drawn up a list of demands, presented them to the 
Board, and had them roundly rejected. As Gallaudet‟s official timeline declares, “The day 
ended with both sides firmly entrenched in their opposing positions and with no quick 
resolution in sight” (“The Week”). By March 8th, students were demonstrating so 
profusely and effectively that national news sources saturated Gallaudet‟s campus, 
interviewing students and faculty, broadcasting their struggle for self-determination 
across the country (“The Week”).  
In August, I visited Gallaudet‟s extensive archives on the revolution. In my mind, 
the protests seemed vaguely connected to Children of a Lesser God. In 1980, Medoff 
received a Tony for his role as playwright in Children of a Lesser God (“Introduction”).  
In 1986, a film of the same title, although notably different, premiered (Felleman 110).  
In 1986, again, the actress who portrayed Sarah, Marlee Matlin, became the first deaf 
woman to win an Oscar for Best Actress. In 1987, Matlin both astounded and enraged 
hearing and deaf Americans by speaking rather than signing an award introduction at the 
Oscars (Through Deaf Eyes).  And, in 1988, students at Gallaudet University, the only 
liberal arts college for the deaf, successfully protested the institution of yet another 
hearing president (“The Impact”). In terms of time, Gallaudet‟s protests seem to fall 
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neatly into a linear pattern of Deaf rights, Children of a Lesser God ushering in a 
burgeoning sense of Deaf pride. Thematically, of course, both the play and the protests 
deconstruct stereotypes and champion Deafness. While intriguing, my nebulous musings 
seemed ultimately inconsequential. 
At Gallaudet‟s archives, however, I found two distinct pieces of evidence that not 
only suggest fuzzy thematic similarities but draw a visible parallel between the play and 
the protests. On March 9
th
, 1988, Nightline held a roundtable discussion on Gallaudet‟s 
revolution with Jane Spilman the head of the Board, Elisabeth Zinser, the unwanted 
president, Harlan Lane, esteemed Deaf theorist and professor at Gallaudet, Gary W. 
Olsen, Executive Director of the National Association of the Deaf, Greg Hlibok, 
Gallaudet‟s Student Body President, and, curiously, Marlee Matlin, deaf actress made 
famous by her portrayal of Sarah. Reading this transcript, I found myself wondering why 
might an actress, albeit a deaf one, be involved in this debate on self-determination. 
Directly related to the protests, however, I didn‟t question the transcript‟s place in the 
file. 
In this transcript, Ted Koppel introduces Matlin as “a symbol of pride for many 
deaf people around the country” (2). In many ways, Koppel‟s assertions seem a credible 
reflection of the importance of Children of a Lesser God and Matlin‟s role in it. Lane 
calls Children “the best-known example of a contemporary work of art concerning deaf 
people” whose “award-winning performances by deaf actresses…apprised Americans 
(and Europeans of the struggle between deaf people and hearing professionals” (Mask 
41). Asch and Fine similarly refer to Sarah, who “demand[s] that the world accept [her] 
on [her] terms” (251). In fact, references to Children of a Lesser God and particularly to 
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Sarah recur repeatedly throughout the disability canon. Children of a Lesser God, Sarah, 
and those actresses who have portrayed her, especially Matlin, have become “symbol[s]” 
of the disability rights movement and Deaf pride. No other cultural production of 
disability can claim the widespread integration into the mainstream as Children, just as 
no other representation of disability has so fully been welcomed by the disabled cultures 
as well. While referring to Matlin as a “symbol” of deafness undoubtedly minimizes her 
capabilities for criticism and further homogenizes the diverse group collectively included 
under the identifier “D/deaf,” Koppel‟s articulation and Matlin‟s inclusion suggest just 
how powerful the play, movie, and representations can be in communicating and 
transforming public opinion. 
While I think Matlin‟s presence speaks to the enormous importance of media in 
American culture, I also maintain that her inclusion links Children of a Lesser God to 
Gallaudet‟s protests for self-determination and self-worth. On the same day that Matlin 
appeared on ABC Nightline News, the State-Times in Baton Rouge, Louisiana published 
a brief article on an Illinois production of Children. Local D/deaf individuals were 
boycotting the production for casting hearing actors as its deaf characters. Despite being 
tucked in a file on the Gallaudet protests, this article includes no explicit reference to 
Gallaudet or the revolution. Its only connection is the date, Deaf pride, and, most 
importantly, Children of a Lesser God.  
While Medoff claims that he had no intention of rallying deaf pride and that his 
true purpose was to tell a love story (“Not So”), his play became a force of its own, 
echoing and resounding through both American hearing and deaf cultures.  For the first 
time, deaf people had a play and a movie that gave genuine thought and depth to deaf 
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characters.  For the first time, hearing people as a mainstream culture considered and 
engaged with deafness and deaf people. These two strange pieces of evidence correlate 
much of what I have been arguing. Not only did the play have tangible and visceral 
repercussions on daily, lived deaf experience, but it also urged a community of 
interdependence and reliance among the deaf and among hearing people. Firstly, the play 
called hearing people‟s attention to deafness. This attention could not have been more 
exiguous. Even the article on the boycott hesitantly refers to deafness as “a hearing 
problem.” It seems like the hearing world was the one with the hearing problem. The 
protests appear dependent, therefore, on this opening up of communication about 
deafness that the play and the movie garnered. I argue that the play, its widespread 
audience and its popularity, directly correlate with the success of the DPN protests.  
Secondly, the protests and the boycott were at once, as many civil rights protests 
were and are, a movement for communal acceptance and self-determination. They are 
“individual yet as one” (89). The play suggests, as do the protests, that disabilities are not 
a private, individual problem, but a communal and social one. Disabilities are not 
something removed from the public sphere and relegated to a private, domestic, and 
quarantined spaced. Rather, disabilities are called into being as part of a national identity. 
The play, through its call for community and interdependence, does not necessarily 
threaten American, individualistic identity but asks Americans to expand and refine their 
own definitions of selfhood. Through the genre, it makes its message reality, creating 
through the audience and interdependent, egalitarian network of critical thinkers, 
“individual yet as one.” 
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